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The Shape of Things

IN SO FAR AS THE FRENCH ELECTION WAS A choice between Soviet Russia and the United States, rather than a mere choice of city officials, the United States won, hands down. Whatever else they voted for, the people who piled up De Gaulle's big total voted for American aid this winter. Few of them may have read Senator Bridges's report of his personal warning to Premier Ramadier that "we would not tolerate communism" in France, but they know, just the same, that a Communist victory at the polls would have endangered the chance of large-scale help from America, both now and when the Marshall Plan comes up for discussion in Congress. By comparison with this stake, Russia's offer of wheat to France looked too little, too late, and too expensive. The final returns are not available as we go to press, but three things are already evident: First, the De Gaulle movement has grown, in a matter of months, from an amorphous *rassemblement* to the first party of France. Second, by throwing its support to the Gaullists, the M. R. P. has practically voted itself out of existence. And, finally, the combined vote of the working-class parties—Socialist and Communist—exceeds De Gaulle's by nearly 500,000. The latter factor will have no concrete meaning if the Communists and Socialists continue to fight among themselves. On the other hand, if the two parties abandon their present hostility and adopt a program of common action, it may have a decisive influence on the future course of French politics. Otherwise, political logic indicates that, in the coming months, De Gaulle will solidify his gains, with strong backing from Washington, and perhaps return to power.

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FRIENDS AND ENEMIES OF THE MARSHALL Plan will both find ammunition in the report of the committee of government experts headed by Secretary of Interior Krug. Assigned the task of exploring the state of our resources and reporting on their adequacy to contribute to foreign reconstruction, the committee has gathered a lot of interesting facts together but failed to reach any clear conclusions. Current high production and consumption in the United States, it tells us, are causing a strain on our productive facilities and resources. However, supply difficulties are not "generally attributable to exports," which account for only a fraction of our gross product. On the other hand, the report declares, a foreign-aid program would have a two-fold impact on our economy: it would intensify certain current shortages and it would enlarge the drain on natural resources, which are already subject to a dangerously rapid rate of depletion. The committee seems to believe that a program of foreign aid involving four to five billion dollars annually for four years would not merely continue existing strains on our economy but add to them. Yet even with loans on this scale, it is almost certain that our exports to foreign countries in the next four years will decline in comparison with the past nine months. That record volume was only sustained by loans and grants at least equal to the amounts likely to be made available in the future, plus prodigious drafts on foreign reserves. Consequently, new loans will not mean an increase in the dollar spending power that has been available to Europe this year; they will mean, at most, its partial replenishment.

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WHAT IS TRUE—AND THE KRUG REPORT discusses this point at length—is that foreign demand will tend to be concentrated on a few commodities of which there is a world shortage. The result will be a succession of supply problems which will be complicated by the jamming of one bottleneck into another. Thus, Europe could increase its own food production if it could get nitrogenous fertilizers, and it could expand its nitrogen output if it could get more coal. We have huge coal resources, but production is being checked by lack of freight cars, the output of which is in turn held back by insufficient steel supplies. In more ways than one, steel, it seems, is the key bottleneck, but the experts approach the subject of breaking it in a very gingerly manner. An increase in steel capacity, they point out, would itself absorb large quantities of steel, and, in any case, it is doubtful whether raw material would be available to feed new furnaces. They express the hope that output from existing capacity will be increased by technological improvements, and they call for industry-government cooperation in expanding raw-material supplies, particularly scrap, and in channeling finished steel to meet the most urgent demands. In his foreword, Mr. Krug does something to offset the rather negative

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tone of the report. It proves, he says, that the American economy is physically able to undertake "a considerable program of foreign aid" without jeopardizing national security or living standards. While some strain might be experienced, the war had shown that the American economy had great flexibility and strength. In short, the Secretary concluded, "what we as a nation can do depends in great measure on what we set out to do." That is the real answer to the question whether we can afford to meet Europe's most urgent need as set forth in the sixteen-nation report: if the will is there, the means can be found.

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JUSTICE JACKSON'S PROPOSAL THAT THE Supreme Court hand down a clear-cut decision on the validity of divorces granted in the various states—a decision that "simple people can understand and live by"—served at least to dramatize an absurd and very troublesome situation in which an American's marital status may change if he crosses a state line. At the time, the court was hearing two cases in which Massachusetts courts had invalidated divorces granted in Nevada and Florida. The Justice urged the court to do something definite, since previous rulings were conflicting and confusing. Justice Frankfurter took up the cudgels for precedent. "The people who wrote these opinions may be in their graves," he said, "but the wisdom of their opinions lives on." This argument seems misplaced, if the opinions contradict each other. We are not sure that the Supreme Court should or could bring order out of this chaos, but certainly order should be made. Theoretically, the best solution would be the passage of uniform divorce laws which really coincided with the *mores* of a country where, for better or worse, divorce has become an accepted device for the pursuit of happiness. The trouble is that the end-products might be laws which would make divorce uniformly difficult and so encourage devices, legal and illegal, for getting around them. Perhaps a more sensible idea would be to press for a convention by which each state agreed to recognize the divorces granted in every other state.

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BESIDES THE MOMENTOUS SQUELCHING OF John L. Lewis—and even that should not be taken as definitive—the conventions of the two great labor organizations reflected sentiment but made no history. The A. F. of L., it is true, for the first time in its long life set up a political agency to replace its traditional hit-or-miss technique of rewarding a friend here and punishing an enemy there. But the odds are against its "educational and political league" achieving much in the way of a coherent campaign, inasmuch as the federation's top men are as divided as they ever were between Republican and Democratic allegiances. The C. I. O. Politi-

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cal Action Committee, which has had the advantage of being nearly solidly Democratic, is to be overhauled for a more comprehensive job of campaigning than it has ever undertaken. But it, too, is now assured of political headaches, as the thinly veiled struggle over the convention's foreign-policy resolution revealed. Philip Murray achieved the phenomenal by getting surface agreement on an indorsement of a "sound program for post-war rehabilitation" in which the Marshall Plan was not so much as mentioned. Communists like Irving Potash, of the Fur Workers' Union, professed to see in the statement "not a Marshall Plan, or anybody else's plan, but a C. I. O. plan." And George Baldanzi, who has no use whatever for the Communists, supported the statement with the explanation that "we are for the ideas enunciated by Secretary Marshall, no matter how the hell we write them in this resolution." But no one was deceived into believing that either side found the resolutions to its liking or that the left-right division is not deep and serious. Murray made his own attitude clear by the simple device of inviting Secretary Marshall to address the convention, thus affording him a C. I. O. platform from which to reply to Russian charges that he speaks for Wall Street.

*

ON AT LEAST TWO OTHER COUNTS, THE representatives of the left must have found the convention a sore trial. First, Jack Kroll, speaking for P. A. C., told the delegates that "a third party is definitely out," that "there's nothing worth while for us in a third party in the immediate future." And, second, R. J. Thomas, bitter opponent of Walter Reuther in the United Automobile Workers, lost the support of Murray, which he enjoyed last year, and as a result lost his seat as one of the nine vice-presidents. A factor in Murray's switch, aside from his own apparent drift to the right, was the charge that Thomas was flirting with John L. Lewis, who has long been attempting to wean the automobile workers away from the C. I. O. or split their union. In this sense, Lewis was defeated at Boston as well as at San Francisco, where the A. F. of L. met. In his own organization, Lewis's fortunes are at a low ebb. He was soundly beaten in his effort to keep the federation from having any truck with the National Labor Relations Board; branding his colleagues as "cravens" and "fat and stately asses," he as good as dared them to carry on without him, and they dropped him from the council; and, finally, he heard his catch-all District 50 denounced on the floor for raiding other federation units. He did succeed in averting a resolution to this effect, but only by having it referred to the council. Should the council find against him, he threatens once more to walk out on the federation—only this time he will go out as an embittered lone wolf rather than the leader of the most advanced forces in the labor movement. It is understood that a place on the council will still be his for the asking, and, after a proper period of sulking, he may decide to take it.

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IN ADDITION TO ITS OTHER ADVERSE SCORES, the Eightieth Congress may claim the record of being the Congress which was kindest to the groups seeking to loot what is left of the American public domain. A House Public Lands Committee, headed by a chum of the big ranchers, Frank Barrett of Wyoming, has just recommended that the United States Forest Service lose, for three years, its right to reduce grazing permits in the National Forests. This will mean that, until 1950, rangers cannot prevent sheep and cattle from chewing off the bunch grass which anchors the topsoil. Floods, drought, erosion, and ugly hillsides will be the inevitable results of such a policy. The public will lose; the sole beneficiaries will be the handful of ranchers who graze their herds on land belonging to the government. This is of a piece with Mr. Barrett's bill to abolish the Jackson Hole National Monument. The monument protects for all the people a great scenic area which has belonged to them since the days of Lewis and Clark. Abolition of the National Monument would revoke their rights, for the land then would be available to Mr. Barrett's ranching friends. Sheep and cattle would graze on mountain pastures now reserved for campgrounds and for such big game as deer and elk. It is adding insult to injury to graze the beef now selling at epic prices on land belonging to the men and women who are victimized every time they visit the butcher shop.

A New Loan to China?

SECRETARY MARSHALL is expected to make his long-delayed announcement of a new policy toward China within a few days, possibly before these lines are read. Details of the policy, like the report of General Wedemeyer on which it is to be based, have been a closely guarded secret. But Washington rumors and well-authenticated reports from high Chinese officials in Nanking indicate that Wedemeyer has recommended a billion-dollar loan to bolster up Chiang Kai-shek's sagging forces, with a proviso that the civilian and military uses of the loan be strictly supervised by Americans. Part of these funds are to be used, it is said, for expansion of the American military mission in order to train and equip ten Kuomintang divisions to be used in "sealing off" the Communists in North China. While there is no certainty that Secretary Marshall will accept General Wedemeyer's recommendations, it is difficult to see why such a strong supporter of Chiang Kai-shek should have been chosen for the "fact-finding" mission except to find justification for aiding the Kuomintang.

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The long delay in acting on General Wedemeyer's report suggests, however, that the State Department, and possibly General Wedemeyer himself, are far from happy about the probable results of stepped-up American assistance to the Kuomintang regime. They are aware that no constructive results have been achieved by the more than three billion dollars' worth of equipment and other goods that has been poured into China since the closing days of the war. They have seen international relief supplies diverted to political ends and sold in the open market for the enrichment of Kuomintang officials despite the best efforts of the UNRRA authorities. They know that slackness, incompetence, and corruption in Kuomintang ranks have increased rather than diminished as the economic and military situation has grown worse. And they have seen Chiang's glowing promises of increased civil liberties and democratic rights wither before a succession of political arrests and drastic new censorship regulations. Nor has this fresh wave of terrorism been directed primarily against the Communists. The Democratic League, the most important of China's middle parties, has been suppressed in some areas, and most of the hundreds recently arrested in Peiping for alleged opposition to the government were members of the liberal wing of the Kuomintang.

In view of these facts, it is idle to pretend that American assistance will be given out of pity for the Chinese people or to aid in reconstruction. If the loan is given, it will be a political loan of the crudest sort. As Wedemeyer himself phrased it recently, it will be designed to keep China from moving into the orbit of Soviet Russia. No one knows this better than the Chinese themselves. Numerous prominent Chinese individuals and groups have issued statements urging the United States not to send further military or financial help to the Nanking government. Just this past week, Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang, China's "Christian General," who has held high government posts and is second in military rank only to the Generalissimo, declared in New York that further American aid could only intensify the civil war and delay reconstruction. He characterized the Chiang Kai-shek regime as "a bottomless pit" which cannot possibly be filled, and expressed the hope that Americans would see this and make their views known before it is too late. He stated that the Nanking government had deliberately spread the story in zones devastated by recent fighting that the anti-Communist expeditions had been ordered by the United States. This had fostered anti-American feeling among the innocent victims of the civil strife.

Granted that the United States is determined to use its financial resources in a gigantic campaign to check the advance of communism, we can think of no place where it is likely to get less for its money than in China. Many more billions of dollars than Americans are willing to spend would be required to insure Chiang's position against attack. A billion or even two billions would, like the billions already spent, fail to fill the hole. Meanwhile, the popularity of communism in China is bound to be strengthened rather than weakened by the perpetuation of the corrupt dictatorial regime that holds power. Nor are superficial reforms imposed by American advisers likely to win the affection or confidence of the intensely nationalistic Chinese. Hard-hearted though the advice may seem, the most effective aid that can be given to China at the moment is no aid at all and the maintenance of a policy of strict neutrality in its revolutionary war.

Line-up on Palestine

WITH Britain firmly insisting on its new role as "neutral" in the Palestine debate, the play passes definitely to the United States and Russia. The speech by Colonial Secretary Creech-Jones has been attacked as obstructive and hostile to the solution his government invited when it handed the Palestine issue to the United Nations. And so it was. But it was wholly consistent with the position he took at the start of the present session, and so merits no new abuse. It leaves England on the sidelines, hands in pockets, while the Big Two uneasily carry the ball. And it has one positive virtue: it may force the other powers to act promptly, before the British walk off the field altogether, for by this time no one doubts that Mr. Creech-Jones meant business when he announced that his government would shortly pull its troops and civil servants out of Palestine.

What comes next? Will Russia and the United States actively support the policy announced in their respective statements? The issue hangs on this question. As Sumner Welles says on a later page, "Whether we shall now see a Palestine settlement of the nature recommended to the Assembly by the majority of the Special Committee on Palestine depends primarily on whether the Soviet Union and the United States will permit the settlement to be carried out." Already, doubts as to their final intentions are being heard in the corridors and committee rooms at Lake Success. Suspicion is chiefly directed toward the United States, which is said by many persons on the spot to be preparing for a defeat instead of working for a victory. Latin American delegates report an attitude of ostentatious indifference regarding their position on Palestine; seldom has the United States insisted so warmly on their complete freedom to vote as they please. China, too, has consistently backed the United States on major issues, but its statement on Palestine, while avoiding open repudiation of the majority report, was unexpectedly hostile.

The United States delegation is also urging the

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prompt appointment of a subcommittee to make a detailed plan for submission to the Assembly. The composition of this subcommittee, already decided upon by the Americans, would insure a half-hearted attitude on partition. It would also reverse the usual Assembly procedure, which is to appoint a subcommittee *after* amendments have been moved in order to reconcile differences and come back with a report representing the majority views rather than those of a hand-picked group acting in advance of the debate. By the time this issue appears, the facts may be known; but if a subcommittee is voted before the plan has been discussed, we shall have reason to suspect the purposes of the delegates who execute this maneuver. If it does not happen, the prospect of honest American support will look better.

As for Russia, its views were put plainly and well. What make us wonder, in spite of this, how strong its interest may be in seeing them carried out is Yugoslavia's support of the minority plan, recommending a bi-national federal state in Palestine. It is true that the Yugoslav member of the United Nations committee favored this solution from the start. But experience suggests that the Yugoslavs would probably accede to any serious wish on the part of the U. S. S. R. on this point—as the Latin Americans would in the case of similar pressure by the United States. Perhaps Russia merely does not care how its protégés vote on Palestine; but if this is so, it leaves the outcome more than ever uncertain.

The picture is further blurred by French silence. France has plenty of reasons for tiptoeing as lightly as possible over the thin ice of Moslem susceptibilities; but its influence as a member of the Big Five is inevitably diminished by such extreme caution.

At this moment of suspense, what seems likely to be laid before the Assembly is a modified partition plan, scaling down the area allotted to the Jews and restricting their control over immigration at least temporarily —this to satisfy the British as well as the Arabs—coupled with a renewed plea to the Arabs to exercise moderation and restraint and to the British to stay on the job during the interim period—assisted, probably, by some sort of U. N. token police force. This is a guess. It may be proved wrong before these words are in print. But it jibes with a good many facts and also, alas, with our knowledge of the mixed state of mind in official Washington. Such a plan, of course, would be no plan at all. It would mean fighting in Palestine and bitterness in the U. N. But it might easily look to the engineers of the Truman Doctrine like a handy way out of a dilemma —a way to give a little to the Jews and a little more to the Arabs and keep British soldiers on guard a little longer in an area we have so recently discovered to be a segment of the American frontier that we are scarcely prepared to defend it ourselves.

POLITICS and PEOPLE

BY ROBERT BENDINER

Taft, Rumor, and Eisenhower

IT IS something of a tribute to the liberalism of the American voter, if not to his skepticism, that Senator Taft should try at this late date to take on a pinkish coloration. Perhaps his public-relations staff has had nothing to do with the spate of stories linking him with individuals whom he would formerly have damned with enthusiasm, but it has been discreet enough to keep quiet and promote the illusion. First there was the rumor that Harold Ickes was about to come out in support of Taft's candidacy, though the two men seemed to have no more in common politically than a dim view of David Lilienthal, his life and works. The story, I should add, was not scotched by Mr. Ickes in anything like the choleric prose he draws upon when properly aroused. Indeed, the column in which he protested that he had not yet made up his mind in the matter included a passing tribute to "Mr. Taft's ability, his comprehensive knowledge of public affairs, his qualities as a floor leader, and above all else his fearlessness."

Now, from Drew Pearson, comes the far more outlandish suggestion that Taft's "possible running mate" if he wins the nomination would be none other than Walter Reuther. This fantasy seems a bit too elfin to have been conjured up in the Taft office. It is easier to take Reuther's view that it was launched by his factional foes in the Auto Workers' Union, for whom, judging from some of their messages to the union membership that I have seen, no yarn is too far-fetched. Reuther, understandably moved, disposed of the story by announcing that he "would see him [Taft] in hell before [he] would see him in the White House." But the episode is perhaps more complicated than he imagines. As this column goes to press, the notion of a Taft-Reuther ticket can be traced as far as a Chicago publicity firm, P. H. Morris and Associates, which will say only that "a group of responsible civic-minded citizens . . . all Chicago business and professional men" has made the proposal and retained the firm to promote the idea.

However this minor mystery is resolved, there can be no doubt that Taft himself is trying hard to shake off a reputation for diehard toryism. Spurred on perhaps by an extremely sour press, he has reversed himself completely on the statesman-like proposal to kill all social legislation until the Republicans capture the White House. He has now evolved a billion-dollar welfare program for 1948 composed of highly diluted measures for old-age insurance, increased unemployment benefits, medical care, housing, and education—all extremely

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limited in scope and defended on the theory that if a "subsidy extends only to those of the lowest-income groups, it is not socialism."

More pointedly, at Des Moines last week he fairly fawned on Harold Stassen, the party's prudently daring semi-maverick. "Governor Stassen and I have differed on many issues," Taft told their common audience, "but we have not disagreed on fundamental principles." Stassen was careful to point out that his views were "more on the liberal side" than Taft's, but added that he had "a deep respect" for the Ohioan's "integrity, his sincerity, and his ability." So thick was the air with cordiality, in violent contrast to the open hostility between Stassen and Dewey, that it was freely assumed the two speakers had come to an understanding. In fact, the Iowa Republican State Chairman was so carried away by the prevailing spirit of good-will that he publicly announced: "There's the Republican ticket for 1948—Taft for President and Stassen for Vice-President."

Stassen has unequivocally repudiated this arrangement, which is precisely what he was expected to do at this stage of the campaign. But the mere suggestion of a Taft-Stassen alliance should be of distinct help to the Senator. If the deepening shadow that General Eisenhower is casting over all the Republican hopefuls is to be dispelled, the job will take more than the lone efforts of a Taft, a Dewey, or a Vandenberg. A dash of liberalism and a spot of imagination will be required, and the candidate who can count on Stassen as his running-mate will enjoy a distinct advantage over the field.

IT BECOMES plainer every day that the head-off Eisenhower movement is becoming a major political pastime, and the game is being played enthusiastically on all sides. Governor Dewey's staff is reported to be spreading the implausible but none the less effective theory that Ike in the White House is the secret hope of the leaders of Soviet Russia. The Patterson-McCormick papers are really getting warmed up, with John O'Donnell damning the General as "a Franklin D. Roosevelt in uniform"—obviously the harshest thing O'Donnell can say about anyone—and the Chicago *Tribune* calling him "the new Willkie in the Republican woodpile . . . everybody's man but America's."

The Democrats, too, are taking the Eisenhower threat very seriously, and their publicity apparatus is hard at work on the problem. James Roosevelt and Judge Samuel Rosenman, both reported by Eisenhower men to have been inclining toward the General's candidacy, were asked by Democratic headquarters to declare themselves publicly. Both came out for Truman. And from Democratic staff members comes the story that Eisenhower's publicity men are worried about repeated and embarrassing questions as to why Ike does not resort to Sherman's classic formula for heading off a nomination. Their lame answer, as the Democrats gleefully tell it, is that Sherman took his unequivocal and unexplained stand only because he could not make public the real reason, namely, that his wife and children were Catholics and he feared that his candidacy might stir up prejudice. This strained rationalizing can hardly go on for any length of time, but it will have to do until Eisenhower is relieved of military duty and free to forget about General Sherman. Unfortunately President Truman has so far been unable to find a replacement for his Chief of Staff, a fact that Eisenhower's aides are, perhaps a bit nervously, calling to the attention of the country.

What may do Eisenhower more damage among Republicans than any rumor yet floated is Roscoe Drummond's detailed broadcast of a visit to the General by Henry Wallace, Michael Straight, and Bruce Bliven. The *New Republic* trio were said to have urged him to forget the G. O. P. convention and, with their support, to contest the Democratic nomination instead. An Eisenhower spokesman branded the *Christian Science Monitor* reporter's story as "absolutely wrong," and the *New Republic* editors flatly deny that they even called on the General. If this is as complete a fabrication as it appears, it is probably the most devious attempt yet made to deflate the Eisenhower boom.

Mr. Truman's Police State

BY I. F. STONE

Washington, October 19

FOR sheer political idiocy it would be hard to match Mr. Truman's airy dismissal of rationing and of rent and price controls as the methods of a police state. This remark was no chance slip of the tongue, though that would have been revealing enough of Mr. Truman's thinking processes. Nor was it an off-hand answer to a tricky question. At a time when most of the press is either advocating, or reconciled to, resumption of controls Colonel McCormick himself would hardly have asked the President whether they would make America a police state. It was Mr. Truman who launched the horrid phrase at a startled press conference after James L. Wright of the Buffalo *Evening News,* an able and veteran Washington correspondent, asked the President to help him "reason out this food-conservation program." Mr. Truman said it was an attempt to do voluntarily in a free-enterprise country what other nations have to do with police-state methods.

Behind the President his one-man brain trust, Clark Clifford, winced. Several reporters, to make sure they had heard right, proceeded to ask in different ways whether he really meant this to apply to (1) rationing and price control, (2) OPA during the war, and (3) rent control. The President insisted that police state was

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what he meant. He said that anything which had to be enforced on the people smacked of police-state methods. By this naive and sweeping definition all laws and government regulations smack of the police state; it would seem that any state which must employ police is, by Mr. Truman's lexicon, a police state. In fact, the President emerges, though of course unconsciously—and this is above all an unconscious Administration—as a pure-bred anarchist. Down with the police!

This would be good clean fun if Mr. Truman did not thereby throw away the best single domestic issue of the coming Presidential campaign, trip up the plans being made by some of his closest advisers for the reimposition of controls, play into the hands of Senator Taft, and destroy the expectations of those who still hoped the President was basically a liberal though a prisoner of the right. Let me take up these developments one by one. The rise in prices in the wake of OPA's demise can be blamed chiefly on the Republicans, though the responsibility rests on the right-wing Democrats as well. At one point in his press conference the President, while terming price control a police-state device, seemed to be attacking those who had battled to get rid of it. He asked reporters if they did not remember all the talk about prices being held down voluntarily when OPA controls were removed. He said they would find all that very interesting if they went back and read about it. These remarks added to the confusion, since they sounded as if the President regretted abandonment of police-state methods. They were all the more confusing because Mr. Truman has consistently championed voluntary methods of price and profit control. Like Humpty Dumpty, it is impossible to put the President together again.

Some ten days earlier the President's Council of Economic Advisers in its quarterly report had indicated the necessity for the reimposition of controls and had received the impression that Mr. Truman agreed. It was thought that the voluntary food-savings campaign was merely a shrewd build-up for controls. The Democratic National Committee has been attacking the Republicans for the inflationary spiral and trying to rebut Senator Taft's factually irrefutable statement that Mr. Truman shares responsibility with the Republicans for the runaway rise in prices and the collapse of the housing program. The two did in truth run a race in the early fall of 1946 to see which could get rid of controls sooner; it was Mr. Truman who scrapped meat rationing and jettisoned the Wyatt housing program. But all this might have been glossed over if Mr. Truman had now taken the offensive, said "I told you so," and begun a campaign for renewed controls, now growing popular again. Nor was such strategy dictated only by political expediency. The whole so-called Marshall Plan and the hopes of world reconstruction rest on the maintenance of the American economy on an even keel. For this purpose some controls are essential, and Mr. Truman's ill-conceived phrase will increase his own difficulties in imposing them. At his first move to slow down the inflationary spiral he will be accused of importing the principles of the "police state."



I don't think this will have much effect on the next election. Mr. Truman is still Roosevelt's heir, and the latest Gallup polls show a steady trend back toward the Democrats as prices rise; the masses of farmers and workers still feel that the Democrats are New Dealers at heart. This feeling, barring some sharp change of policy or, perhaps, the nomination by the Republicans of Eisenhower, may reelect Truman. But it will not insure effective leadership in meeting the severe problems ahead. A man who calls price control a police-state method, who dotes on Mr. Hoover and has loaded down his official family with bankers, brass hats, and nonentities, cannot be expected to handle the next depression with the kind of economic planning which will be required.

The easy way for this man and the men around him is drift—drift toward a bust, and drift toward war. Washington under Truman is a capital of confusion, incompetence, and reaction. Those who live here can be under no illusions as they see the government departments purged of the mildest liberals by the growing red scare abetted by the Truman Administration. The police state is not a state which uses policemen but a state where men's lives and reputations are at the mercy of arbitrary action without fair trial. If Mr. Truman wants to understand the police state, let him look about him in the District of Columbia, where one can see its beginnings applied to the employees of his own government. They know the terror of the anonymous accusation, and some have already heard the secret police knock on their door in the dark hours before dawn.

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The Littler Assembly

BY J. KING GORDON

Lake Success, October 20

IT IS a mistake to reduce this Assembly to its most obvious definition: a struggle between the great powers of the East and the West. For even within this definition there are subordinate meanings that change the over-all picture. In the usually accepted polarization you have simply a power struggle or, ideologically, the clash of two political and economic systems, one rooted in a revolutionary faith in a workers' state, the other holding hard to the principles of free enterprise and personal liberty. But many modern societies standing between these two have built into their economic systems large measures of social control which still admit of free political expression for the individual. England and France may be generally on the side of the United States in any showdown with Russia, but they distrust American capitalism about as strongly as Soviet communism.

Alongside this complex East-West conflict there is another—the drive of the colonial peoples for full independence against the reluctance of the old empires to yield what they have always considered their possessions. This struggle is evident in the tense debates in the Trusteeship Committee, with India leading the fight to force South Africa to obey the last Assembly's bidding and bring its mandate over South West Africa under the Trusteeship Council. It is to be seen in the Security Council when the Indonesian question is up for discussion. It is to be seen in the colonial powers' resistance to the nomination of the Philippines and Norway to the Trusteeship Council. That Russia sides with the colonial peoples is giving it added prestige, particularly in Asia.

These struggles are being carried on not in separate compartments but interpenetrating one another, so that the outcome is at no time certain on any particular issue. Nor will decisions at Lake Success or Flushing do more than put a check on the mighty human forces expressed in national hopes and aspirations, fears and frustrations. An attempt is being made in the United Nations to bring an angry and confused world under the control of reason and law. It can be done if the organization can hold together—but not in a week or a month or a year.

One other trend evident in earlier debates but most obvious in the discussions of the past week is the increasing dissent of the small powers from the decisions of the great. At times this dissent has merely been expressed in a grumbling protest. Delegates have told me that in the big-power conflict they don't want to stand up and be counted. But this week we have seen the influence of the small powers essentially changing the policy laid down by a great power.

From the beginning it was clear that the majority of the members shared an exasperation that the effectiveness of the United Nations was being frustrated by the Russian veto in the Security Council. No amount of Soviet pleading will persuade the nations outside the Russian group that the principle of unanimity is to be equated with a wholesale use of the veto. As Pearson of Canada put it last Saturday, "We are all vitally concerned that unanimity should prevail amongst the great powers, especially on measures necessary for the maintenance of peace. The fact is, however, that such unanimity does not exist. . . . We are in a situation where the unanimity rule has become, in effect, both the rule of dissent and a guaranty of inaction."

The American proposal for an Interim Committee has therefore been generally accepted in principle as a means by which the prestige of the Assembly can be increased in order to compensate to some degree for the impotence of the Security Council. But there has been wide criticism of its details. Sweden, France, the United Kingdom, Canada, and other nations have pointed out that the original terms of reference in the American resolution would bestow on the Little Assembly much greater authority than was desirable. The most serious amendments were proposed by Britain's Shawcross. These would remove from the surveillance of the Little Assembly all matters having to do with atomic-energy controls and disarmament and any question actually before the Security Council, and would prohibit it from conducting any study or investigation on the soil of a member state without the consent of that state.

Canada's resolution agrees in part with the United Kingdom's, but suggests that the scope of the Interim Committee should be broadened to permit it to do preparatory work on matters which had been placed on the next General Assembly's agenda—not merely matters having to do with peace and security. Other nations have brought forth similar amendments.

The American proposal, therefore, by the time it emerges from subcommittee study will be substantially whittled down. The Soviet delegate will have more difficulty in suggesting that the Interim Committee will in fact have more power than the Security Council or the General Assembly. The Little Assembly will, as one American remarked, be a littler assembly by the time the subcommittee is through with it.

This does not mean, of course, that it will be any more palatable to the Russians, who may boycott it as they boycotted the Greek commission. But if they study this new role of the middle and smaller powers they should be convinced that a mild revolt is brewing against Uncle Sam as quarterback. It is not a form of Soviet appeasement. It is, perhaps, a positive move away from power politics in the direction of those principles of cooperation expressed in the United Nations Charter.

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Palestine and World Peace

BY SUMNER WELLES

[*At the dinner of the Nation Associates held at the Waldorf-Astoria in New York on October 13, Sumner Welles, former Under Secretary of State, made the address which appears below. The subject of the evening's discussion was The Palestine Solution and Its Relationship to World Peace. The other chief speakers were Bartley Crum and Richard H. S. Crossman, M.P., American and British members, respectively, of the Anglo-American Committee on Palestine.*]

TO ALL those millions of Americans who believe that their nation, because of the influence and power it possesses, should utilize that influence and that power so as to facilitate the solution of international controversies which block the establishment of a free, peaceful, and lasting world order, the past few years have been a profoundly discouraging period. For in the case of Palestine the great opportunity for leadership offered to our government had not been seized. Last Friday this situation radically changed. The United States has at length assumed its responsibility and undertaken a most constructive initiative.

I am not here to speak to you of any of the specific aspects of the Palestine problem, aspects which necessarily arise in an objective appraisal of the recommendations for settlement that have been advanced. Nor would I venture to dwell upon the continuing tragedy of those hundreds of thousands of homeless Jews whose spirits and bodies are rotting in the concentration camps of Central Europe and to whom no hope has as yet been given that they are to have any chance of safety or any opportunity for a new and better life in the days to come. There are many among you who have seen with their own eyes this horror and who have been struggling valiantly to put an end to a tragedy which need never have existed and for which there can be no justification.

But I do wish to speak to you on the issue which seems to me chiefly to concern us here tonight. That is the relationship of the Palestine settlement to world peace.

It would take long to enumerate the reports of the individuals and of the organizations, official as well as unofficial, which have now for many years been investigating the problem of Palestine. Many of these investigations, unfortunately, were undertaken for the sole purpose of procrastination. Many were ordered merely in an effort to avert a crisis which might otherwise be imminent. There is perhaps no other question of international import upon which so much authoritative information is available, and upon which the time and thought of so many able men and women have been expended. What so far has been lacking is the courage and the decision and the authority by which action might be taken on the basis of those facts.

I had hoped last spring that the period of evasion and buck-passing was at length concluded; that the repeated efforts of the British government to prevent any solution and the unsavory attempts of the government of the United States to saddle Great Britain with full responsibility, while at the same time refusing to lift a finger to make a settlement possible, had at last reached their end. For a new and great development had taken place. The nations of the world, at a special meeting of the Assembly of the United Nations, had declared their intention of seeking a settlement of the Palestine question and had appointed a Special Committee on Palestine to undertake a final investigation and to recommend to the full Assembly at its session this autumn whatever solution might in their judgment be most equitable and practicable in the light of all the legitimate interests concerned.

The overshadowing significance of that step could not be exaggerated. It meant that the free peoples of the earth had decided that a just and lasting settlement must be promptly found, and that the moral opinion of the world would support whatever decision the Assembly might finally reach upon such a basis.

AS WE all know, a few weeks ago the Special Committee submitted its findings. The recommendation of the majority of the committee—and it is pertinent to emphasize the fact that the nations represented in that majority could not conceivably be considered as having any partiality or any prejudice—proposed the partition of Palestine and the establishment within the Holy Land of a Jewish and an Arab state.

Many questions can legitimately be raised as to this, that, or the other detail contained in these proposals. But no unbiased man or woman can fail to recognize that, granted the lateness of the hour, granted the urgency of the need, granted the developments that have taken place since the report of the Peel commission was rendered ten years ago, and granted the crisis with which humanity today is convulsed, these proposals are the best that could at present be carried out and are inherently wise and just.

The majority report has, of course, been assailed by the Jewish extremists. It has, of course, been made the target of the Arab nationalists, who assert they will reject any settlement through which the Jewish people would at last attain the National Home long since prom-

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ised to them. But I think there can be no question that a vast majority of the outstanding leaders of the Jewish people support the form of settlement now under consideration by the United Nations, however far short it may fall of the ideal for which they had hoped, and that a vast majority of the Arab peoples would accept, even though reluctantly, a settlement which puts an end to a controversy whose continuation can be of no benefit to them, were they to learn that the United Nations was determined to impose such a settlement.

If we view the world as it is today realistically, we cannot fail to see that force—economic force as well as armed force—still continues to be the dominating factor. Every delegate to the United Nations knows that unless the three great powers—Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States—jointly support whatever decision the Assembly may reach, and jointly undertake to facilitate the carrying out of the Palestine settlement, no settlement is going to be carried out. However strongly the other member states may feel that the settlement proposed is altogether just, however sincerely they may believe that such a settlement is imperative if a major conflagration is to be averted, they possess by themselves neither the armed might nor the economic resources required to bring about its consummation.

The United States has now spoken. It recognizes the urgent need for a final solution at this session of the Assembly. It supports the majority plan which provides for partition and immigration. While I question the wisdom of some of the modifications it advances, I regard other suggestions offered as altogether desirable.

From the standpoint of the realistic approach to the crux of the problem there is no more encouraging feature of our government's long-awaited statement of policy than the declaration that "the United States is willing to participate in a United Nations program to assist the parties involved in the establishment of a workable political settlement in Palestine" . . . and "in meeting economic and financial problems and the problem of internal law and order during the transition period." For here are more than words or expressions of sympathy. Here is the promise of material help and cooperation.

The position of Great Britain was made known by the statement of Mr. Creech-Jones to the Assembly. We can at least hope that the position then announced may yet be modified. It would be inconceivable, if the Assembly now approves a final settlement based upon the provisions of the majority report, that the British government would evacuate its administrative and law-enforcement agencies from Palestine before the Assembly's plan could be implemented, and thereby open the Holy Land to probable bloodshed and anarchy at the very moment that the United Nations was preparing to assume responsibility. The present difficulties of the British people must not be overlooked. But the United States was fully justified in urging that the mandatory power should not withdraw until a smooth transmission of authority can be assured.

There remains the problem of the attitude of the Soviet Union. Once before, at the Assembly's special session last spring, the Soviet government categorically stated it would support partition as an alternative form of settlement. The Soviet Union has now reaffirmed this position. We have reason for deep gratification that in this outstanding instance the Soviet government has shown a clear intention of helping to make the United Nations function and of working for world peace rather than for world disruption.

LET us strip away all unnecessary verbiage and assess the basic issues upon whose solution a Palestine settlement now depends. They are few in number.

The relations between the Soviet Union and the United States are every day becoming more critical. If the Palestine settlement is thrown into the whirlpool of power politics that now threatens to engulf the entire family of nations, no solution will be attained. If Moscow and Washington permit the question of Palestine to be used as an instrument in this looming conflict between expansion and containment, whatever final decision the Assembly may now reach will be void. Yet there is no reason that can be found to justify so needless a frustration. The establishment in Palestine of the Jewish and Arab states now proposed could never in itself be regarded as a threat to the safety of the Soviet system or of the Western powers. Only if these two new states came under the exclusive domination of either the East or the West could any fear be legitimately aroused on the part of one of the major powers. Great Britain has announced its wish to begin immediately the withdrawal of its occupation forces from Palestine, save in the remote contingency that the Assembly's decisions need not be imposed. Moscow can, consequently, no longer charge that Britain intends to use Palestine as a strategic base against Russia.

But since in all human probability the Assembly's recommendations for a Palestine settlement must be imposed and since an adequate police force must, therefore, be found, is it not unquestionable that if either the United States or the Soviet Union attempts to bring about the employment of its own troops for such a purpose, the Palestine question will inevitably become a cause for further suspicion, for further controversy, and for increased hostility between these two powers?

If the police force is American, the Soviet Union will construe such a decision as an aggressive step on our part. If the police force is Russian, such a measure will at once be interpreted throughout the West as a new indication of the Soviet government's intention to seize the Dardanelles and to dominate the Mediterranean.

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And we know only too well from what has taken place in Korea what a joint Soviet-American administration of foreign territory implies.

It is for these reasons, which seem to me so altogether clear, that I publicly suggested some days ago that the major powers announce that no one of them would send military contingents to Palestine for policing duties, and that they agree that the Security Council should establish, after calling upon intermediate and lesser powers that had no conceivable interest in the Palestine settlement for their cooperation, a Palestine police force composed of military contingents from those powers, under the authority of the Council's Military Staff Committee. It has been said that such a suggestion is not realistic, that too many practical difficulties stand in the way, and that the problems of over-all authority and of expense constitute insuperable obstacles. The truth is, of course, that such a solution of the problem of security is wholly practicable provided the major powers wish to make it so.

If the Soviet Union and the United States are willing to cooperate in this regard, the Military Staff Committee of the Security Council is competent to adjust the question of over-all authority, and if the member states of the United Nations recognize in practice the obligation they have already unanimously incurred, the expenses of the administration of Palestine during the transition period and of an adequate police force are obviously expenses which should be shared proportionally by all the United Nations.

Frankly, such a solution of the need for maintaining law and order during the transition period seems to me far more effective and expedient than the suggestion of the United States that the United Nations establish a special constabulary or police force recruited on a volunteer basis. A volunteer force would necessarily take a long time to recruit and assemble and a long time to train. What criterion, moreover, should prevail as to the national origin of the recruits? What percentage of recruits should any given country be allowed to send? What authority would be responsible for screening the recruits? Would there not be constant suspicion that agents of the major powers were being incorporated into such a volunteer force?

If the lesser powers, as I have suggested, sent some of their own military contingents to undertake the required policing work in Palestine during the transition period, these governments would be each responsible for the membership of the forces so employed, and none of the controversial questions I have mentioned could arise.

WHETHER we shall now see a Palestine settlement of the nature recommended to the Assembly by the majority of the Special Committee on Palestine depends primarily on whether the Soviet Union and the United States will permit the settlement to be carried out.

We are told that the troops of the Arab states are now encircling Palestine. Propaganda is being directed toward the delegates to the United Nations Assembly, and toward public opinion in the West, to make it appear that hostilities will be inevitable if the Assembly adopts the proposals of its Special Committee. If the Assembly permits such blackmail tactics—such an open violation of the solemn commitments into which every Arab country has entered—to remain unpunished, and to sway its final decisions, the authority of the United Nations will be irreparably impaired. But can anyone in this room believe that the threats of violence now being made could ever be carried out unless the Arab governments received the secret support of one of the great powers? Can anyone doubt that if Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States unanimously declared that the decision of the Assembly was also their decision and that they would unitedly support the execution of the steps required to impose it, the attempted blackmail which we are witnessing would not rapidly be shown up for what it is?

Unless the means of securing effective collaboration among the three major nations can now be found, not only will the final settlement of the Palestine problem continue to be remote, but the immediate consequences may be of appalling gravity. Is it already too late for us to have ground for the belief that some field for cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States can yet be found? Must we assume that the one world for which we had hoped and for which we have striven is already irreparably divided into two worlds, with all of the consequences that such a division inevitably portends? Need we disregard the lesson which the history of recent centuries should teach us—that if two antagonistic and rival nations find some field for cooperation, this experiment in cooperation can bring about an alleviation of tension and encourage the gradual solution of controversies which had earlier seemed altogether insoluble?

I, for one, cannot reconcile myself to the belief that it is already too late. I believe that the Palestine settlement affords both the Soviet Union and the United States precisely such a field, within which cooperation between them is altogether feasible, and that if they will but employ it they will find the path toward the solution of the differences between them much easier to follow.

There has been no greater tragedy in recorded history than that which the Jewish people have suffered during these past few years. Yet it is possible that through the settlement of the Palestine problem—the one fitting compensation which humanity can offer the survivors of that tragedy—the peoples of the world may find the way to avert a new holocaust, toward which we seem to be so rapidly drifting and in which all that remains of our civilization would inevitably be destroyed.

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Mr. Attlee Changes Horses

BY AYLMER VALLANCE

London, October 17

NEW men, new policy? That question has been on many lips since it became known last month that the Prime Minister proposed to meet the new parliamentary session with a reconstructed administration. From the Cabinet appointments announced this week no clear evidence is to be deduced pointing to any radically different program. Mr. Attlee has changed horses in mid-stream, but the main observable effect is merely that the "pulls" within the team have altered slightly; the government coach seems likely to continue in much the same direction.

The inner history of this Cabinet reconstruction has provided observers of the political scene with not a little amusement. There is some evidence that the Prime Minister, keeping his deliberations very much to himself, had completed to his own satisfaction a full list of Cabinet changes a fortnight ago, and that this list was much more extensive than the one eventually published. In particular, it seems to have been intended to replace A. V. Alexander by John Strachey at the Ministry of Defense, and to intrust the portfolios of Transport and Labor to younger and stronger hands than those of Mr. Barnes and Mr. Isaacs. However, for reasons unknown to this correspondent, Mr. Attlee decided to announce the appointment of Sir Stafford Cripps as Minister for Economic Affairs in advance of the general Cabinet reshuffle. This put the ministerial fat in the fire. It was at once apparent to the Foreign Secretary that Sir Stafford, elevated to the position of coordinator of the departments of Trade, Labor, Fuel, Supply, and Public Works, would be in a position to voice in the Cabinet, and to give added weight to, the contentions of the "Bread Before Guns" school. Mr. Bevin wanted to know whether the coming Cabinet changes would have the effect of further diminishing the influence of his own group in the Cabinet. His curiosity was infectious, and for ten days most of the ministers were absorbed in the task of trying to "get at" the Prime Minister.

The result has been a rather peculiar compromise. Up to a point Mr. Bevin has had his way: the retention of their portfolios by Messrs. Alexander, Barnes, and Isaacs means that the Loyal Regiment of "Bevin's Own" has not suffered the casualties which he feared. With Mr. Dalton and Mr. Morrison somewhat eclipsed (Mr. Attlee suspected them last June of an intrigue to make Ernest Bevin Prime Minister), there is a nice balance of power within the Cabinet between Crippsites and Bevinites, leaving the Prime Minister in a strong position as chairman with the casting vote. For the rest, a good deal of dilapidated wood has been excised, and the new Cabinet, taken together with the list of junior appointments, promises a perhaps more competent administration.

It certainly contains no signs of a shift to the left. Emanuel Shinwell has been relegated to the routine obscurity of the War Office under the double thumb of Messrs. Bevin and Alexander, and his place at the Ministry of Fuel, which now loses a seat in the Cabinet, has been taken by Hugh Gaitskell, ex-lecturer in economics and ex-director of a company dealing in fine prints. Mr. Attlee—or even, it may be, Mrs. Attlee—had come to regard Mr. Shinwell as a political liability ever since his public speeches began to show an anti-middle-class bias. Whether this, or his known opposition to Mr. Clayton's demand that exports have a first priority on future coal output regardless of the requirements of domestic industry, was responsible for Mr. Shinwell's downgrading is a matter of speculation. Certainly the middle class should be reassured by the changes in Mr. Attlee's team. There is no ground for saying that they represent a definite swing to the right—leftism in England is not a working-class monopoly—but few of the men promoted or brought in have soiled their hands with manual labor; most of them are public-school boys turned public servants. If they remembered Ruskin's famous crack about Whistler, Mr. Attlee's rank-and-file trade-union supporters might have accused him of flinging a pot of Eton-blue paint in the face of organized labor.

AS FOR policy, the King's speech seems likely to be interesting mainly for its omissions: the expectation is pretty general that there will be no bill this session to nationalize either gas or steel; and the main dish for the autumn will probably be an unsweetened supplementary budget. Of the broad lines of policy for coping with the economic crisis we have already had a fairly full preview. In Mr. Bevin's sector there are no signs of dramatic developments. Some acceleration of the planned release of men from the forces? Perhaps, but certainly no radical break in the masterly continuity of foreign policy. Lightened, it is hoped, by placing the whole burden of the financial cost of Germany on the shoulders of the American taxpayer, British "commitments" abroad will be maintained—at any rate for the present. On the politico-economic chessboard it is for Cripps, not Bevin, to move; and though we have yet to learn how far Chancellor Dalton proposes to go in using the fiscal

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mechanism to aid the switch from consumption to exports, the main lines of the Cripps plan are known. The gap of $2,400,000,000 in Britain's foreign balance of payments is to be closed by import cuts amounting to $850,000,000 and an increase of $1,500,000,000 in British exports. Presto! The solution is found; all that remains is to complete the still very partial adjustment of supplies in the food shops to this winter's reduced import program and wait for British manufacturers and exporters to do their stuff.

That at least was the impression the public derived from the confidence with which Sir Stafford appeared to approach his task. But at his first press conference this week the Minister for Economic Affairs seemed to have begun to share the increasingly grave doubts of observers here about the practicability of his plan unless one of two conditions is fulfilled: either the famous "commitments" must be jettisoned wholesale, or Uncle Sam must, directly or indirectly, foot the bill.

The Cripps plan, in fact, is vulnerable to criticism on a number of grounds. With Britain's customers here, there, and everywhere imposing import restrictions enforced by their own difficulties, the export targets are manifestly optimistic. At any rate, their attainment by the end of 1948 cannot be relied on. Indeed, apart from the question whether markets can be found, the postulated increase of output of exportable goods presupposes a redistribution of labor and a detailed control of raw-material allocation far beyond the somewhat hesitant steps so far taken. Furthermore, no one has yet explained how the proposed expansion in the exports of British finished goods is to be achieved if we make good our undertakings in the Report of the Paris European Conference to supply the Western bloc with such a high proportion of the coal, steel, machinery, and other capital goods which British industry itself requires. And, even if the essential re-equipment of British mines and factories can be postponed for, say, a couple of years, what will happen to the painfully achieved balance between imports and exports when the output of capital goods is switched back, as it finally must be, to home consumption.

Sir Stafford has now admitted what was only too obvious from the outset—that the "balance" at which he is aiming is in one sense unreal. Even if British production and exports can both be increased as planned, we shall continue to have an immense deficit with the dollar area, against which we shall only nominally be able to set credits with Western Europe. Unless those trading credits can be converted into free dollars—which would mean that Mr. Marshall would have to supply the whole Western bloc with good American money to pay for British goods—Britain will not be able to buy what it needs in the way of food and raw materials from the dollar area. As a result Sir Stafford now concedes the grave danger of a "descent into a spiral of depression." The implication is clear that the Cabinet is coming round to the view that only Mr. Marshall and the American Congress can save the situation.

THE question is: Can the dollars be had on terms which the British public and above all organized labor would find tolerable? At the moment a campaign against "dollars with strings on them" is being waged in the press only by the Communist *Daily Worker* and by Lord Beaverbrook's (four-million net sale) *Daily Express*, which is becoming the mouthpiece for sentiment paralleling that of the Italian Qualunquists. Beneath the surface, however, there is a great and growing feeling among trade unionists and the middle-class left alike that the whole basis of the Marshall plan as now outlined makes nonsense from the standpoint of Europe and means Britain's acceptance of the status of a colonial dependency of the United States. The fundamental weakness of the Paris report, as seen here, is that it presupposes a European revival which can only be achieved by planning so totalitarian that it would be completely unacceptable to the nation which is expected to finance it. Mr. Clayton, in short, asked the Western bloc to produce an international plan without national planning—a contradiction in terms.

Sir Stafford Cripps

As for Britain's own contribution, honesty compels me to record that various leakages, revealing clear warnings from Mr. Clayton and other distinguished visitors that the price for dollar aid must be longer working hours and reduced real wages, have produced a strong current of resistance in the trade-union movement. Already the T. U. C. has compelled the Prime Minister to retract his suggestion that wages should be frozen, irrespective of the rising cost of living; and if, as expected, the autumn budget imposes new taxes on consumption and—as is rumored—on domestically consumed electricity, working-class suspicions of the whole "crisis policy" will be deepened.

There will be an increasingly strong tendency in the Labor movement to ask: Cannot we throw overboard more of our costly foreign commitments and reinforce our industrial man-power with at least 500,000 of the men now in uniform? And cannot we get along without dollar aid by concentrating on expanding our trade with

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the dominions and colonies and developing planned bilateral exchanges of goods with the U. S. S. R. and the Eastern European bloc?

This is not to say that Britain shows any sign of a complete polarization of opinion, as in Italy and France, between capitalist pro-American and Communist pro-Soviet groups. Not perhaps fully appreciating how grim the economic outlook is, and how precarious the situation of this densely populated island, the British public—or at any rate that large slab of it which can be called, broadly, social democratic—still wants Britain and the British government to pursue a quiet middle-of-the-road course. The trouble is that in the middle of the road there are as many shellholes as on the East versus West sidewalks from which Mr. Lippmann's "cold war" is being waged.

Panama on the Seven Seas

BY MICHAEL BARKER

THE New York water front today is the scene of amazing happenings that recall the stories of the shanghaiing of sailors on the Frisco and London water fronts in the 1860's. Seamen are being plied with drink and lured on to foreign vessels by South Street shipping crimps; aliens are forced to pay for the privilege of working; men on a ship reaching its home port are transferred against their will to another ship of the same company, where they must accept less pay and worse conditions.

All this derives from the discovery by American shipowners that they can save money by flying the flag of another nation. They can operate their vessels "dirt cheap," they have found, simply by transferring them to Panamanian or Honduran registry. They do this either directly, while retaining ownership, or by forming a dummy Panamanian or Honduran corporation which they control. The procedure has proved so attractive that already the merchant marine of the Republic of Panama (population 635,836) is the third biggest in the world, with 1,500 ships and 2,000,000 registered net tonnage, the major part being in reality owned by Americans, by aliens who are legal residents of this country, or by shipping companies in which Americans have invested most of the capital. Since ships under the Panamanian flag are troubled by no regulation regarding the payment of a fixed wage, are relieved of any necessity to pass the strict American marine inspection regarding upkeep of the vessels, seaworthiness, safety precautions, and fire-fighting appliances, and enjoy extremely low registration fees and immunity from corporation taxes, it is small wonder that many of our less scrupulous operators have seized such an excellent opportunity to make a profit.

MICHAEL BARKER has been seven years at sea, sailing on American, Panamanian, Honduran, British, and Finnish ships. He has recently been investigating water-front conditions for the National Maritime Union.

In addition to the ships already in commission, of which 192 were transferred to Honduran and Panamanian registry between the end of the war and last June, the sale of 110 others has been approved by the Maritime Commission. Another 143 ships have been filed for sale and transfer with the Maritime Commission. The approximate net registered tonnage of these 253 additional ships, most of them built during the war, is 1,500,000 tons.

The majority of established, reputable American steamship companies frown on the transfer practice. With a few notable exceptions the dummy corporations have been formed by a host of small-time, "fly-by-night" operators who buy a few ships and hope to undercut their competitors through cheap and shoddy operating methods. While most of these Panamanian and Honduran corporations are controlled by Americans, some are operated by Greeks, British, Norwegians, or Portuguese. To avoid a brush with the maritime unions, several American shipowners have formed dummy Greek corporations as a blind, which have in turn formed Panamanian or Honduran corporations.

Wages paid on these ships may be as low as $50 a month for an ordinary seaman as compared with $155 on American ships (N. M. U. scale), $87.50 a month for an able-bodied seaman as compared with $180, $90 a month for an oiler as compared with $180 and $197.75 (Diesel), and $400 for a master as compared with $668. However, it is impossible to quote a minimum wage for these hybrid ships, since on two Greek-Honduran vessels a number of Greeks, many of them not seamen, paid as much as $50 apiece for the privilege of taking the vessels from Piraeus to New York, because they were so anxious to return to the United States.

WITH this huge fleet to man at substandard wages and under substandard working conditions, the ship operators are hard pressed to obtain crews. Numerous "crimping joints," dignified by the title of shipping agencies, have been set up around South Street, New

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York, to hire alien and American seamen, stranded on the beach, for Panamanian ships. These agencies receive $12 for every unlicensed man they ship out and $20 for every officer. One character thus employed, known locally as "Shanghai Mike," unable to meet the demand, sends out runners to pick up drunks in the bars and on the park benches of the neighborhood. The runners give their victims more to drink and when they have made them sufficiently befuddled, lure them to a ship or train, where a company official takes over. A parting gift of a bottle of "hooch" keeps them satisfied and comatose until their ship is out at sea.

"Paddy," a stocky young Irish fireman, was told by a British union official in London that if he jumped his British ship in New York he would easily be able to find an American ship which would take him to South Africa to rejoin his wife and child. Paddy quickly learned, however, that he could not get American seaman's papers and found himself stranded in New York. Rather than sign with a Panamanian ship that might dump him in China, he became a runner for Shanghai Mike, enticing drunks on to short-handed ships due to sail. "I would buy them a bottle or a new pair of dungarees, 'spring' their laundry, do anything to get Mike his twelve bucks and expenses," said Paddy. He added, "Now if I can get him run off the water front, I'll be happy."

Because several European governments, including the British and Norwegian, officially oppose the policy of providing crews for foreign-flag vessels, international shipping crimps operate in a number of countries. Hundreds of men have been sent to New York and other ports to sail on American ships under the Panama flag. Before they leave their own country they are told that they are to sail on a ship under their own flag, but once on board they find she is Panamanian or Honduran. They are of course unprotected by their own maritime laws while on a foreign vessel and could not claim one penny's compensation for disablement.

On a number of Panamanian ships crews sign not legal articles but a slip of paper stating they are a member of the crew. This permits the master to leave any of his seamen stranded wherever he wishes. Thus a Panamanian vessel obtained her crew in England, sailed to Greece, and took on a supernumerary crew of Greeks willing to work for 40 cents an hour. From Greece she sailed to an American port, where the British crew was dumped. These men then had to choose between taking out another newly transferred American vessel or starving on the beach.

One American-owned Panamanian corporation makes it a practice to sign on a crew in Portugal at a stated wage and after the ship is at sea to reduce the monthly pay of many of the men on the ground that they are incapable of performing their duties. These men, being Europeans, cannot leave the ship, paid off, in her home port of Philadelphia but can be transferred to another ship at the company's will and against their own wishes.

Since Panamanian ships are often forced to employ officers who have obtained licenses from the Panamanian consul after an entirely inadequate course of study in engineering and navigation, with no properly supervised examinations, accidents are common and vessels deteriorate rapidly. One ship, while in the port of New York, was reported to be creating a fire hazard by the leakage of hot oil from the filter pipes to the deck plates; it caught fire ten days later. On a thirty-two-year old Panamanian vessel held together by rust, holes were chipped in the hatch-combing of a hold containing 10,000 drums of high-test gasoline. The chipping caused sparks, and as if that were not danger enough all hands smoked on deck, despite strong fumes from the ventilators of the hatches.

AMERICAN taxpayers paid $20,000,000,000 to build their war-time merchant fleet. Millions of dollars are lost annually to the government, and indirectly to the taxpayers, through the non-payment of American-port registry fees and the evasion of corporation taxes by American-owned vessels operating under a foreign flag. The cost of registering a ship in Panama City is only $1 per net registered ton, plus $75 in consular fees. The only further charge is an annual tax of 10 cents per net registered ton. If a corporation earns 95 per cent of its profits outside the Republic of Panama, it pays no corporation taxes there.

Both the United States government and the heads of the army and navy insist that the existence of a large merchant fleet is essential for our national defense. At the outbreak of war the shortage of trained officers and seamen caused serious immobilization and delays. Unskilled men, improperly trained, were hustled on to the ships. Unnecessary accidents, shipwrecks, and collisions in convoy resulted. In the first year of the war the fatal casualties on American ships sunk were 50 per cent of the personnel, as against 7 per cent on Norwegian ships.

Already the American merchant marine is down to 11,000,000 tons of commissioned shipping, below its 1941 strength. The transfer of our war-built ships to foreign registry, with their consequent deterioration under incompetent and indifferent management, will deplete it to the point where it will not only be unable to supply the skilled personnel needed in a time of crisis, but will be too small, even, to train recruits for the industry in sufficient numbers. On the other hand, if American-owned ships are returned to American registry, the seamen now sailing them can still be employed, and in addition thousands of newcomers will be enabled to adopt a fine and attractive career.

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Del Vayo—"Democracy" East and West

THE meeting of the European Socialist parties—the fourth in the past two years—is scheduled for the last week of November in Belgium. None of the previous reunions could reach agreement on the question of reconstituting the Socialist International; the creation of the Communist Information Bureau in Belgrade and the storm it has aroused on the left are certain to enlarge the area of disagreement at the coming congress.

The obstacles in the way of uniting Socialists of different tendencies on a common platform are both tactical and doctrinal in nature. One that is likely to provoke impassioned debate at Antwerp is the division of views on the new concepts of democracy in Europe. Here in the United States the problem has never been seriously examined: first, because only a few Socialists in this country have been brought up in the classic Marxist tradition; second, because they do not constitute a party capable of influencing American politics; and, finally, because discussions in the *New Leader* and comparable publications have been heavily weighted with invective against any European Socialist who does not accept—unconditionally—the anti-Russian line.

It is to the credit of the French party that despite the growing anti-Communist tendency reflected at its Lyon congress in August and more recently in the campaign speeches of Léon Blum, those Socialists who argue the necessity of common action with the Communists have been allowed to express their views without being accused of disloyalty.

This tolerance of theoretical differences which, before the First World War, made possible the presence in the same party of a right-winger like Bernstein and a brilliant leftist like Rosa Luxembourg, is reflected in many of the official publications of the French party. *La Revue Socialiste,* for example, recently opened its pages to an absorbing discussion between Lotar Radaceanu, Socialist Minister of Labor in the Rumanian Cabinet and an ardent supporter of working-class unity, and Titel Petrescu, leader of the Socialist faction which opposes any form of cooperation with the Communists.

In Radaceanu's view one can no longer talk of "democracy" in abstract or general terms. Democracy, he insists, is one thing when practiced in London, another when practiced in Bucharest. "From the point of view of the working class . . . ," he says, "to recommend, after the overthrow of the dictatorial power that enslaved our country with the help of a section of the population, that our people accept and allow to be transplanted to Rumanian soil a formal democracy such as has been developed in the advanced capitalist countries of the West—in England, Switzerland, Sweden—is to propose our elimination as a potential democracy of the future." Radaceanu does not limit himself to a defense of left strategy in Rumania but discusses in broad terms the whole concept of democracy, classical and modern.

In recent months I have devoted several columns to this continuing debate among European intellectuals on liberal democracy versus *démocratie massive.* The right Socialist and his sympathizers base their position chiefly on the rights of the individual: the left Socialist interprets democracy above all in terms of a regime that can defend itself effectively against fascist revival and make possible a transformation of the economic and social structure without which the word democracy is meaningless. To the genuine Marxist a political idea has no value, indeed no existence, except in and through the mass. Nationalization of the British steel industry is for him a more convincing demonstration of democracy than an abstraction like "freedom of the press," which in practice may permit a few vested interests to control the newspapers.

Though nationalization was successfully perverted to the uses of fascism, under any popular regime it represents a tremendous step toward democracy. In the Balkan and Central European states a nationalization policy would have had little chance except under the existing coalition regimes which wrested power from the pre-war feudal oligarchies. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive the nationalization of major industries in the West or the East without transfer of power to the workers. This may take place in different ways, depending on the situation which obtains in each country. In an interview with Harold Laski, Stalin himself conceded that the process might occur without revolution or dictatorship in England and the United States; on the other hand many Socialists agree that force is inevitable in politically backward countries ruled by an intrenched upper class.

However intense this controversy may be, however, it should not be allowed to degenerate into a fratricidal fight among the Socialists themselves or into one between Socialists and Communists. During the war both parties frankly admitted that the split in the working class had contributed to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of war. The first official statement of the German Communists after the war acknowledged their tragic error in having fought the Socialists while the real enemy climbed to power. One would think that the two groups might have learned once and for all the lesson taught them, without distinction, in the torture chambers of the Gestapo. Now it becomes apparent that the Communists and the right Socialists in most countries have learned nothing. Today Europe has but two alternatives: either governments patterned after the De Gasperi regime which in the long run will serve, like the Brüning government in Germany, as vehicles for the return of the fascists to power; or governments based on Socialists, Communists, and progressive elements—the popular front. The denunciation of moderate Socialists and liberals voiced in the manifesto of the new Communist Information Bureau and the angry rebuttal of the Socialists suggest that the advocates of working-class unity will have rough going at Antwerp. But they will be strengthened in their fight by the conviction that their program is the only one which can save Europe from an imminent swing to the right and the eventual rise of a new fascism more skilled in its techniques of repression and far more difficult to smash than the earlier model.

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

EVERYBODY'S BUSINESS

BY KEITH HUTCHISON

The Art of Planning

IN CURRENT discussions of economic affairs few words are used more frequently, and more carelessly, than "planning." Employed by people to whom any kind of positive government intervention in the economy is anathema, the word is endowed with overtones of unmitigated evil; anything planned by government is *ipso facto* damned. At the opposite extreme are some liberals to whom the word has become a talisman, who think "planning" is the solution for almost any social or economic problem. Both these attitudes seem to me to be dangerous to clear thinking. For in itself the idea of government economic planning is neutral; whether it is good or evil depends on the ends it serves and the means by which it is applied.

All those interested in planning, whether they are opponents or advocates, will find a stimulating discussion of the fundamentals of the subject in a slim pamphlet recently published by the Harvard University Press ("Central Planning and Control in War and Peace," 50 cents). It contains the text of three lectures delivered last spring at the London School of Economics and Political Science by Sir Oliver Franks, who, though he approaches the subject in terms of British problems, has much to say that is pertinent to planning in any democratic society.

An unusual feature of these lectures is that their author, as he is careful to point out, is neither a professional economist nor a student of politics. He is a philosopher who at one time occupied the chair of moral philosophy at Glasgow University and is now provost of Queen's College, Oxford. During the war, however, he was drafted from academic life to serve in the Ministry of Supply, where he became one of the top officials. Recently he was again summoned by the government to head the British team of experts at the Paris conference on the Marshall plan. Thus he combines practical knowledge of planning with a certain detachment.

I have no idea what political party, if any, Sir Oliver Franks adheres to, but it would be my guess that temperamentally he is a moderate conservative. Certainly he approaches the subject of planning with no bias in its favor. On the contrary, his war-time experiences seem to have impressed him with the difficulties, and even the risks, of government direction of the economy in peace time. Nevertheless, he has reached the conclusion that government planning and control of industry and trade are as essential to Britain in peace as they were in war. Only so, he believes, will it be possible to deal with the paramount problem of foreign trade, to insure the export of goods in sufficient volume to pay for the huge total of imports that Britain needs to support even a reduced standard of living. To accomplish this task the government must be in a position to estimate national productivity and decide how to divide the expected product between home and foreign markets.

Convinced as he is that planning is inevitable, Sir Oliver Franks is very concerned about the dangers of over-planning. The government, he thinks, should endeavor to reach its objectives without the aid of those large and complicated mechanisms, some of which he describes in his first lecture, that war-time exigencies demanded. While the determination of over-all economic policy must be centralized, its successful implementation, he suggests, depends on the "diffusion of initiative." Attempts to control every detail of the program are all too likely to lead to a breakdown of the overworked administrative machine. Industry and commerce, therefore, must be treated as partners in a national enterprise rather than as instruments of government policy.

This leads to another point. The successful organization of economic planning must be based on a unity of purpose which is accepted and understood by all concerned—workers and business men as well as Cabinet ministers and civil servants. In war time that was much simpler: unity was generated by the "march of events." But in peace time national purposes are apt to be "multiple, vague, and fluctuating"; so that the unity demanded by planning must be created by a deliberate act of will on the part of the government. When the ministers have formulated what they believe should be the national purpose and have decided on a general plan for the economy which is calculated to achieve it, they must nail their colors "to the mast and not to the fence." And they must use leadership to secure the public's acceptance of the purpose and understanding of the plan.

Planning, therefore, calls for a high degree of courage and leadership at the top. It also calls for close coordination among the various departments, including some whose functions are not, strictly speaking, economic. As Sir Oliver says, central planning precludes a government from having a number of more or less unrelated policies. "Housing, social security, exports, education, and defense are all factors in the general plan: the extent to which resources can be devoted to each is determined when the general balance is struck. The idea, then, which is expressed in import and export programs must be an outline scheme of management for the total economy, offering certain results in the standard of living to the people."

Sir Oliver makes no attempt to examine the actual plans of the Labor government in the light of the principles he outlines. But it is no secret that Mr. Attlee and his colleagues owe some of their difficulties to the fact that they set out with too many insufficiently coordinated plans and no over-all plan geared to the basic necessity of expanded exports. Consequently, to quote just one example, the housing target has been missed because houses cannot be built without foreign timber. The appointment of Sir Stafford Cripps as chief economic planner and coordinator is a step which should help to remedy this mistake. Certainly no man has a better intellectual grasp of the problems involved. But as this discussion is intended to suggest, planning, although it uses many scientific techniques, is an art rather than a science. In addition to a cool brain it calls for those intuitive qualities that go with the mystery of leadership. Warm admirer of Cripps as I am, I am inclined to doubt whether those qualities are among his many gifts.

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BOOKS and the ARTS

Byrnes Tells Almost All

SPEAKING FRANKLY. By James F. Byrnes. Harper and Brothers. $3.50.

THE best advice former Secretary of State Byrnes offers in his revealing new book is to be patient in the contemplation of international affairs. Americans who, forgetting this admonition, let the bitter words of Vishinsky and other Russians arouse them to angry demands for Soviet blood only hasten the world toward explosion into a new war or at best drag down American diplomacy until it becomes futile gesturing. The great value of Byrnes's book lies in its recapitulation of the victories that the United States has achieved diplomatically, by patient plodding under stress, since the conclusion of World War II.

Byrnes reminds us that America persuaded Russia to remove its troops from Iran, and that the United Nations sent a mission to Greece to investigate the border battles in spite of initial Russian disapproval. He recalls that Russia and the United States created the mechanism for the control of occupied Japan which at its birth seemed to give Russia a voice in Japanese affairs but which actually has kept General MacArthur master of the situation. These successes, and also the five satellite treaties which went into effect a month ago, emerged from disagreements as profound as those over Korea, Austria, and Germany which today blacken the outlook for peace.

Byrnes's counsel of patience, however, has become so difficult to accept in this period of strain that he himself rejects it. "I have not lost hope [for world political stability]," he wrote. "I would say that our policy should be one of firmness and patience." Yet in speaking over the radio on his book's publication day, October 15, Byrnes abandoned himself to a prediction that war might come unless Russia improved its behavior. Even in the book itself, discussing the need for "firmness," he said impatiently, "We must use our best efforts to develop better bombs and more of them." That might provide a pragmatically sound—but terrifying—basis for a foreign policy if the existence of the A-bomb scared the Russians back inside their ancient boundaries. So far it has not.

The book is a major political document. It focuses on American relations with Russia from January, 1945, when Byrnes was ordered by President Roosevelt to come along to the Yalta conference, to January, 1947, when he resigned as Secretary of State. The man has always been a mercurial person, subject to quick shifts of opinion and emotion. Molotov, to whom "any exhibition of impatience or bad temper by others gives amusement," goaded him into losing his temper during the Paris peace conference in 1946. But his two-year period of responsibility for United States foreign affairs sternly educated and hardened him. He had become a firm man when he left office, and he had learned how to negotiate with Molotov. Is it possible that our present dilemma is partly due to the sudden replacement of Byrnes with a man who had only a vague notion how to proceed in dealing with the high officials of the Soviet government?

Almost the entire course of Byrnes's brief career in diplomacy was a test of patience. Russia dismayed him immediately after the Yalta conference by rejecting American interpretations of agreements made there. Vishinsky reconstituted the Rumanian government without consulting the Western Allies. The Kremlin insisted that "broadening" the Polish government meant adding men pleasing to the Moscow-manufactured Lublin regime. Stalin accused America and Britain of seeking a separate peace with Germany when they arranged at Berne in March for General Kesselring to meet General Alexander at Caserta to discuss the surrender of the Italian army.

The important disclosure that Byrnes makes in connection with those three happenings is that President Roosevelt himself was coming close to disillusionment. Roosevelt told Churchill on March 27, 1945, that "he was acutely aware of the dangers inherent in the present course of events." He added, "We must be firm." Roosevelt and Churchill on April 1 sent a joint note to Stalin protesting against Russian interpretations of Yalta, and the State Department and the British Foreign Office were preparing another note when Roosevelt died on April 12.

It was in this atmosphere that Truman asked Byrnes, while both were returning from the funeral at Hyde Park, to become his Secretary of State—not at once, but at the conclusion of the forthcoming San Francisco Conference on the United Nations. The supposition that Truman and Byrnes destroyed a perfect understanding cementing Roosevelt and Stalin is interred by this book. But in the present time of crisis it is necessary to recall the message Roosevelt sent to Churchill one hour before his death: "I would minimize the general Soviet problem as much as possible because these problems, in one form or another, seem to arise every day and *most of them straighten out*, as in the case of the Berne meeting." Most of them may continue to "straighten out" if we do not let panic seize us.

Considering the public temper, Byrnes was an able Secretary of State. Why he left the post he does not explain. Perhaps he angered Truman during the Wallace crisis. Byrnes reveals that he resigned by teletype from Paris when Wallace attacked the foreign policy Byrnes was developing. To keep his Secretary of State, Truman sacked the Secretary of Commerce. But Byrnes soon followed.

His key problem in office was to determine the aims of Soviet policy. He thought he had the answer in the territorial discussions Molotov had with Hitler and Ribbentrop during the period of the Russo-German pact—control of the Dardanelles and all the region south of the U. S. S. R. toward the Indian Ocean, North Sakhalin, and various European areas—something short of world domination but a large region. Byrnes accepted Karl Marx as his guide for diplomatic action to frustrate Soviet realization of those ambitions—Marx who wrote of czarist Russia, "If the other

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powers hold firm, Russia is sure to retire in a very decent manner."

Both the patience and the firmness advocated by Byrnes betray a kind of chauvinism; he seems to assume that right and principle are almost always on our side. We need another book questioning whether the Russians, from their point of view, have had reasonable cause to suspect us of ill-will toward them. Within a year we may get some light on this point from the memoirs of Harry Hopkins. BLAIR BOLLES

Concerning Existentialism

EXISTENTIALISM. By Jean-Paul Sartre. Translated by Bernard Frechtman. Philosophical Library. $2.75.

WHAT IS EXISTENTIALISM? By William Barrett. Partisan Review Series. 50 cents.

WHATEVER its future may be, existentialism has come a long way. Everybody is talking about it, a delightful lack of clarity pervades it, and an American publisher is selling a little lecture of Sartre's for a ridiculously high price. The lecture happens to be a bad one, as deficient philosophically as it is full of energy and pleasantry. "There is no human nature," Sartre announces, "since there is no God to conceive it." And we go on to learn the "first principle of existentialism," that "man is nothing else but what he makes of himself." Fortunately, in the present instance, we are served better by the philosophic historian. Dr. Barrett's essay is really worth reading. It is sensitively written, discerning—and only rarely extravagant—in its historical judgments, charitable, and yet soberly critical.

Barrett devotes a good deal of attention to the work of Martin Heidegger, otherwise inaccessible to American readers and to philosophers guided by the ordinary canons of intelligibility. Wisely refraining from the attempt to assemble a set of doctrines, he offers his own version of the traits that define existentialism. Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche, he suggests, are "purer" existentialists than the official systematizers, Heidegger and Jaspers; they have "a superior sense of fact." I don't think it is part of Barrett's meaning to imply a distinction between sense of fact and knowledge of fact. But in any case it would not be to the existentialists, official or unofficial, that one would ascribe mastery of fact, especially in matters human: it would be to Plato and Aristotle, Hobbes and Hume. The merit of the existentialists has been rather to distinguish the unusual, the arresting, the evanescent, the surprisingly pertinent in human experience: they have swelled rather than modified the fund of perception. Barrett is on surer ground when he says that the original "existential task" was to address the individual, the unique man longing for salvation, and that Heidegger himself departed from this task in his remote metaphysics.

Barrett sees existentialism as part of a larger, century-old enterprise which he calls "the search for the concrete." Unhappy term, "concrete"—as unsatisfactory in Barrett as in Whitehead and William James. But it is clear that what the existentialists look for in the appeal to "concreteness" is the emotional content that can be discovered in things. Barrett's way of putting this is to mark existentialism as a phase of romanticism, and Heidegger's philosophy in particular as "the scholasticism of the romantic individual." The movement reflects the quest for intensity in living, an intensity which this super-technological century appears to be destroying relentlessly. Existentialism has resulted in "an extraordinary widening and enrichment of data," but Barrett deplores the growing gulf that separates it from so-called analytic philosophy. Moreover, Sartre's existentialism, he feels, dwells too much on the phenomenological surface and could profit—in its examination of anti-Semitism, for instance—from psychoanalysis, which "dares to go below the surface." And, finally, he believes that when existentialism lapses into idealism it "loses its pungency, its sense of fact." Barrett might have asked, more plainly and explicitly, just what senses of "existence" are involved in all the clamor. No doubt existentialists would be found to differ with respect to whether the "existence" that interests them is the immediate foreground of experience or the great environment of nature. But pungency is not what would be at stake in their answer; in fact, nothing would be but the extent of existentialist mythology.

It is not easy at present to evaluate or place existentialism. To call it a mere reflection of modern confusion or "an assault on reason," as some responsible persons have done, seems at best an oversimplification. Existentialist writers have caught forcefully the great fact of tragedy in modern society. Since the rediscovery of Kierkegaard—a true progenitor, if ever there was one—they have been inventing and exploiting a new set of moral categories: despair, the will to be guilty, the choice of oneself, the absurd, the absolute decision. High-sounding terms! I wish Barrett had pointed out that the spectacular and the novel are not sufficient conditions for depth in ethical thinking. He, incidentally, is of the opinion that despite Kierkegaard's case, romanticism is basically incompatible with the Christian tradition. But this does not account for the peculiar fervency of existentialism, the religious romanticism of men like Unamuno, and the fact that there are Christian existentialists. Sartre, in the present lecture, emphasizes his atheism and its importance as giving meaning to the idea of human forlornness. Yet this is an evangelical atheism. The emotion with which the existentialist categories are filled has a curiously ancient theological flavor. The whole movement is zealously therapeutic, even in its concern for secular salvation.

Existentialism as a moral philosophy is thrust forth rather than developed and argued. And in a way the literary brilliance of its exponents obviates dialectical justifications. Certainly if one had to choose between the literary species of existentialism and the dense verbosity of its formal metaphysics, the decision would not be difficult. Thus far, at least, the greater success has been in narrative, semi-biographical, and dramatic contexts, where standards of explication and rigor are irrelevant. As logical positivism once came to liberate men from the duty of understanding historical speculation, so official existentialism threatens to liberate them from precision and intellectual discipline. It has not fully grasped the fact that paradox and terminological wit are instruments, not ends. The distinctiveness it can claim still lies in the quality of its imaginings. In vain does Sartre pontificate that "subjectivity must be the starting-point," that "existence precedes essence," that "before there

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How to avoid destructive emotional conflicts



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can be any truth whatsoever there must be an absolute truth." For Sartre's talents the spontaneous theology of Kierkegaard, innocent of philosophic responsibility, would seem to be the more promising model. Maybe the public, as Aristotle suggested, can be relied upon to make the ultimate literary choice. It will continue to favor Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, and Sartre's own fiction.

JUSTUS BUCHLER

Twelve Days on Iwo Jima

THE ASSAULT. By Allen R. Matthews. Simon and Schuster. $2.50.

IT IS not dulness of spirit that makes the average man decide that it is enough to have read three or four "combat books," but a wise economy of his powers to resist anxiety. I should not, therefore, urge *Nation* subscribers to read "The Assault" if it were merely another excellent book of the sort. It is a good book, uncommonly good, and its material is twelve days' experience of Iwo Jima, surely the most terrible of the Pacific encounters.

Long ago Stendhal, who knew something of war, wrote the classic description of battle in "La Chartreuse de Parme." His hero canters about the landscape looking for the battle and when it is over believes he has not found it. That description has often been criticized as a *blague* or as something which progress in the art of mass extermination has outmoded. Mr. Matthews's book confirms Stendhal, though his experience was unlike that of Fabrice del Dongo in that there was hardly a moment of those twelve days when danger was not within an inch of his cheekbones. Nature, to keep men up to scratch, or out of mere pique, even provided an earthquake, and foxholes were apt to fill up with hot sulphurous steam. But other writers about battle, the author says, appear to have *seen* too much. Battles to those engaged in them do not have geometrical shapes. There is nothing consecutive or logical about the movements the soldier glimpses around him. Men run fitfully or crouch in odd postures; they shout and gesticulate, fall down or writhe and lie still, but all this is seen only at moments, when someone staggers through the fog of fear and frantic obsession.

There are many good objective descriptions in this book, but in its distinctive quality it reminds one of Camus's "The Stranger." Camus's man, in his unconscious effort to reject all engagement with life, wanders like a somnambulist through a brilliantly described world. Upon Iwo Jima the desperate effort to blanket out fear, to bludgeon the instincts into turning against themselves, produced a kind of somnambulism in which reason behaved like an obsessed manikin, yet somehow an effective one. "The Assault," in which the other ingredients of a combat book are present in good measure and quality, is remarkable in this respect. It is, as it were, a superb textbook for the study of the conflict between two mechanisms; on the one side duty and remembered training, on the other, fear. One sees how the desire to do things the right way—so small an incentive?—operates within a storm of near-panic. In the presence of huge fear the other emotions flash like fireflies, briefly. Resentment of the command, anger at blundering comrades, relief, enjoyment. And one also sees clearly how the very inability to grasp the whole enables the will to survive. A man's *felt* world of relations is his own small group, and so loyalty remains constant, as constant as fear.

When at the close of his twelve days Mr. Matthews was sent to the rear, dejection was immediate. Reality was back there where his comrades were. Relieved of fear, loyalty instantly spread out beyond the group and covered all the men upon that front. That is the absorbing thing in this book. It is as if the author were reporting a tremendous laboratory experiment. Exhausted men, almost broken, are pulled back out of action. They expect to be sent into rest. The command comes, no one knows quite how, to return to the front. With the suddenness of lightning, anxiety produces a wild, spuming efflorescence of rumor. Anger, grief, and immediate fear produce only laconic utterances. Anxiety is voluble. Mr. Matthews may think I have missed much that he considers important in his book. I have not. He can write so well, for instance, that if I were still a publisher's editor I should throw overboard all professional etiquette and ask to see his next manuscript.

RALPH BATES

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The Philippine Problem

THE PHILIPPINE STORY. By David Bernstein. Farrar, Straus, and Company. $3.75.

CAN we afford to permit our friendship with the Filipinos to deteriorate into antagonism, hatred, and possible bloodshed? Can we afford to say 'good riddance' to the Filipinos and stand by, bemused, while they stagger in the direction of the Soviet Union?" Thus Mr. Bernstein in the peroration with which he concludes his proposal of a twenty-five-year plan of American aid to be offered "to assist the Filipino people in building an economic structure that will last for generations." At the time he was writing it had not become apparent that the first stagger would be not in the direction of the Soviet Union but in the direction of Franco Spain. This does not rule out the possibility of an ultimate goal which is very different—one of the characteristics of a stagger is that the staggerer may go backward as well as forward—but it does point to the fact that the Philippine problem is perhaps more complicated than the author of this book seems to understand. That problem did not begin when the Americans gave the Filipinos their independence, or when MacArthur was taken at night from Corregidor, or when the Spaniards handed the Islands to the United States some fifteen years before Mr. Bernstein was born. At that time Americans inherited trouble which had been three hundred years in the making, and any attempt to write wisely about the Philippines must have behind it a more than cursory study of the institutions which the Spaniards found there and those which they installed there.

Mr. Bernstein's thesis is that the Philippine Islands and their people emerged from the war in a very difficult position, that they could not at the time afford the independence which had so long been promised them, that the act of giving them that independence has not freed the United States from an obligation to give continued assistance to its former wards. With this thesis few could quarrel. But to put it into force in the form of administrative measures, grants of aid, and so on is a very different matter, and one which sets up question marks all along the line. It was not for lack of warning of trouble ahead that independence was granted on the promised date with as much panoply as could be summoned by a shattered people standing at attention as best they could while their capital lay in ruins about their feet. No Filipino leader had dared risk his future by asking that the accolade be postponed. No responsible American statesman thought it possible to make the world believe that the delay would be solely for the good of the Filipinos. So the fatal comedy was played as planned; Mr. Bernstein's suggestion that now it would be nice if the United States offered a twenty-five-year aid plan, against that background and no strings attached, is, in the present state of world tensions, not a very realistic one.

In the main this book is polite, well-informed, and temperate. There is not much in it that will be new to *Nation* readers, but it is useful to have all this information in one place. Mr. Bernstein's knowledge of the Islands dates from his official connection with them during the late war. In 1942, while serving with the OWI, he met the then

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

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President, Manuel Quezon, who had been rescued from the Japanese siege by the United States. At the latter's request the author set up the Office of Special Services for the Philippine government in exile, acted as political adviser, helped beam short-wave news and information to the Islands. After the Japanese surrender he became special adviser to Quezon's successor, President Osmeña. He knows many of the leading personalities in government circles, and he does not speak unkindly of his friends, or of the Huks who were not his friends.

Concerning the economic plight of the Islands he says quite rightly that the United States, by giving the Philippines the advantages of free trade, continued that deviation from their native norm which the Spaniards had started. Geographically, they should be a great market sitting astride sea routes in the Asiatic trade. But they were pulled by conquest toward the West, first into the Spanish orbit and then into the American pattern.

In a world consisting almost entirely of "ifs" it is interesting to speculate on what might happen were the Philippines to be cut loose from American ties and left free to resume their old place at the crossroads of an island world off the coast of Asia. Unfortunately the island world is not what it used to be, and has not been for some four hundred years. Neither is Asia, nor the United States, nor Spain, which made all the trouble in the first place.

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A Westerner Goes East

RICHER BY ASIA. By Edmond Taylor. Houghton Mifflin Company. $3.75.

EDMOND TAYLOR, after something over two years in India, Ceylon, and Southeast Asia, from 1943 to 1946, found his intellectual and spiritual life greatly enriched. If the world at large, he feels, could learn what he learned in that experience, it too would grow much richer by Asia. His enrichment consisted in coming to understand for specific reasons what he might have been willing to admit only in disembodied principle before he went there: namely, that Asia and Asians have a right to their own lives free of Western imperialism, which is injurious to them and the imperialists alike; that their cultures have values, chiefly of the mind and the spirit, which the rest of the world should understand and at least in part employ; that through the recognition of these facts mankind can achieve the state of one world which will forestall other wars. Institutions and nations, he tells us, like individuals, quarrel and fight because they suffer from paranoid delusion, which seems to be just another way of saying that they misunderstand one another's motives and needs and give way to panic and irrational conduct expressed by violence. Mr. Taylor's ideas are evidently sound enough, though they are hardly novel and do not in themselves constitute the interesting part of his book.

The real value of the work lies in the author's full and careful statement of the steps by which he reached his convictions. He analyzes his intellectual experiences in the greatest detail, and the subject of the book is actually the education of Edmond Taylor. Since he has unusual powers of self-analysis and a fluid, vivid, and rich prose style, this personal history is absorbing and stimulating, except in a number of spots where excess of detail and repetition tend to relax the attention of the reader.

Mr. Taylor has remarkable skill in investigating individual and public sentiment through conversation and interview, and he has obviously supplemented this by considerable reading and reflection. His book may therefore help other thoughtful men who cannot duplicate his experiences to obtain some measure of the rich education which he has so conscientiously recorded.

W. NORMAN BROWN

Fiction in Review

A REVIEWER who has persistently battled the popular notion that a novel is as good as its politics must do a bit of backtracking in the case of Humphrey Slater's "The Heretics" (Harcourt, Brace, $2.75). Perhaps, after all, a novel is as good as its political heart in at least this one sense—that if it has a truly sound political core, this healthiness is likely to be reflected in the feeling tone of the whole work. There would certainly seem to be a relation between Mr. Slater's decent political point of view and the fact that his book suffers from none of the weaknesses endemic in our contemporary fiction of good-will; it is not priggish, condescending, or inflated. On the contrary, its manner is beautifully quiet, self-respecting, direct, consistently matching its disciplined political intelligence with a disciplined literary taste.

But unfortunately Mr. Slater's good sense and taste, while they save him from the common pitfalls of current political fiction, seem also to put a strong brake on his novelistic energy. "The Heretics" is lamentably underwritten in point of character development and drama. It is only the suggestion of the fine novel it might have been, a seed rather than a full growth.

Mr. Slater divides his story into two sections, the first dealing with the Albigensian heresies of the early thirteenth century, the second with the Spanish civil war. The connection is only ideological: Mr. Slater is giving us a comparative study in fanaticism. But he also contrives a narrative link by carrying over the names of the chief characters in the first half of the book to the second. Four children are the main actors in the early section of "The Heretics"—a brother and sister, Paul and Elizabeth, their friend Simon, and Moro, the Moorish boy with whom they join forces after their parents are killed as heretics. Seven centuries later a Paul and an Elizabeth, brother and sister, and a friend Simon are again Mr. Slater's principal characters; in the confusion

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of the Spanish war, in which the three of them become variously involved—Elizabeth as a correspondent for the English papers, Paul as a Trotskyite soldier, Simon as a Stalinist soldier and spy—the old quartet is completed by Cordova, Elizabeth's Spanish lover. It is a stunty contrivance, without either intellectual or emotional validity.

For the fact is that no more than Mr. Slater's modern characters are present-day counterparts of the Albigensian orphans is the Spanish civil war a modern equivalent of the heresy-hunting of the Middle Ages. "The Heretics" is not saying anything so mechanical as that history repeats itself. What it is saying, if I read it correctly, is that the instinct to fanaticism has been fairly constant throughout history. Just as a dedication to the ideals of the church issued in the reign of terror against the Albigensians, so a dedication to the Soviet ideal produced the ruthlessness of the Spanish Communists; in whatever period, that is, there is a reverse of violence to the coin of principle. Mr. Slater's parallels between the child victims of the church crusades and the Russian *bezprisoni,* between the trials of the heretics and the Moscow trials, between the Nominalist-Realist issue and the theoretical issues of radical dissidence have a more than literal significance. They indicate the paths of thought and feeling that connect man to man over the centuries.

The earlier portion of Mr. Slater's book is historically interesting. It was nevertheless a mistake for Mr. Slater to have included it in the same novel with his Spanish material, which, quite by itself, has such fine fictional potentialities. Probably no one who has written about the Spanish struggle is better qualified for the task than Mr. Slater, both in military knowledge—he fought in the Spanish war and he has published several books on military strategy—and in political insight. "The Heretics" has none of the sentimentality or political ambiguity that marred Hemingway's "For Whom the Bell Tolls." Its author is not caught by the myth of heroism, nor is he afraid to move completely into the open with his indictment of the Stalinist command in Spain; the book's most brilliant passage, indeed, is a short satiric chapter describing a meeting of the Operational Policy Commission, three Spaniards and three Russians. Yet despite these advantages, "The Heretics," as a work of the imagination, is not to be compared with Hemingway's Spanish novel. Every human situation in it, every occasion of drama, is, if not entirely thrown away, taken at its lowest pitch—quite as if the whole business of novel-writing were properly conducted only on the scale of a well-bred drawing-room conversation.

And one's disappointment at Mr. Slater's undue reticence turns to bitterness if one happens, as I did, to read "The Heretics" hard upon Frederic Wakeman's "The Saxon Charm" (Rinehart, $2.75), which is one of the most inept books ever to come my way, and yet one of the most self-proclaiming. The new novel by the author of "The Hucksters" has a novelist as its protagonist and a good deal to say about the profession of literature. Clearly, Mr. Wakeman believes that the writing of novels is a very superior pastime, for he provides opportunity for everyone in his book to acclaim it. Whenever Novelist Eric Busch, hero of "The Saxon Charm," utters an inanity, which is whenever he opens his mouth, there is a bystander to murmur, "What wisdom!" And obviously Novelist Busch would feel no less strongly about Novelist Wakeman than Novelist Wakeman feels about Novelist Busch.

Let other reviewers risk libel by naming the likely original of the villain of Mr. Wakeman's piece, the prodigious play-producer whose genius for the theater is so heavily larded with egotism that it leaves no room for the genius of his playwrights. I am content merely to report that Mr. Wakeman calls him Matt Saxon, and that he comes nowhere near making a credible fictional character out of him. We are intended to understand that Saxon's malign charm was the temporary undoing of a fine writer named Busch who had written a fine play about the life of Molière. (Happily Mr. Wakeman spells Molière correctly; the same cannot be said of his repeated spelling, "Stendahl.") People who can believe in the quality of Busch and of Busch's dramatic effort, or who can even remember with respect that there was such a person as Molière after Mr. Wakeman's manhandling of him, will no doubt also believe in the inordinate power for good and evil of Mr. Saxon. I am not one of them.

But I should add that my untempered response to "The Saxon Charm," however much it may result from the contrast between Mr. Wakeman's entirely unwarranted confidence and Mr. Slater's unwarranted modesty, is also directed to a culture which encourages such cheapness as Mr. Wakeman's and even pays dearly for it. The terms in which the hero of "The Hucksters" left the advertising business and committed himself to the life of art should perfectly have prepared us for the kind of art we get in the novel that follows "The Hucksters." There was every evidence in Mr. Wakeman's book about radio advertising that the point of view of its author was identical with the point of view of its chief character, and that if, after he broke with his old world, Mr. Wakeman's hero went on to be a writer he would simply lay aside his "sincere" neckties for "sincere" ideas. But self-revelation was read as healthy self-criticism, Mr. Wakeman was credited with a conscious act of social usefulness, and anyone who failed to appreciate his service to American life was accused of refusing help when it was offered.

Perhaps the same accusation will be leveled against the critic who fails to welcome Mr. Wakeman's newest seriousness. Perhaps here the ungenerosity will be found to lie in tracing so close a connection between the quality of "The Hucksters" and the quality of "The Saxon Charm," in failing to encourage Mr. Wakeman's journey from Mammon to literature. But I risk the imputation in view of the substantial aid our society makes available for such travelers. The report is that the movies

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encouraged Mr. Wakeman with $250,000 for "The Saxon Charm," in advance of publication. DIANA TRILLING

Drama

JOSEPH WOOD KRUTCH

MAURICE EVANS'S revival of "Man and Superman" (Alvin Theater) is said to be New York's first since 1912. Even the Theater Guild steered clear of it in the days when the Guild was treating Shaw as a staple commodity, and it gave—privately—as its reason the belief that this particular play was too heavily loaded with doctrine to be still viable. But it is obvious now that these fears were groundless. When you leave out the famous scene in hell—which has almost never been played—and forget all the published paraphernalia of preface and appendix, what you have left is a vigorous farce-comedy merely spiced with brains. Indeed, the present reviewer, at least, was struck by nothing more forcefully than by the fact that as time goes on it becomes more and more evident how completely the best of Shaw's plays are in the grand tradition of classical comedy, how relatively superficial is that overlay of "modernity" which once seemed the only reason why they could be considered "important."

At the performance which I attended the audience seemed predominantly "Broadway." I saw no evidence that any considerable number of its members were professional Shavians or, for that matter, that the play was familiar to them. They burst into laughter at the right moments, but it was the genuine laughter of surprise, not the dutiful laughter of those who know what is expected of them. I doubt that the references to the "life force" and the other specific Shavian doctrines were anything more than rather vague allusions to what are now vague commonplaces. What the audience was seeing and reacting to was simply a fresh version of one of the oldest comic situations—that, namely, in which a man's surrender to the wiles of a woman is a better joke than usual because he knows what is happening to him and continually protests that it never will. John Tanner may think that he is something new in the world. Nothing like him, so he thinks, could have existed before Marx and Bergson had revealed the truth about the world and the universe. But in actual fact he and Ann are merely Benedict and Beatrice. They are also, especially in the last act where Tanner makes his big speech explaining why he consents to marriage and how different his marriage is going to be from any that ever was in the world before, merely Millamant and Mirabell. Of course they talk a different lingo. They give different reasons for doing what men and women have always done. But the difference between Tanner and Mirabell is no greater than the difference between Mirabell and Benedict. Congreve rewrote Shakespeare in the terms of his age; Shaw rewrites Congreve in the terms of ours. And to say this is, of course, not to belittle Shaw but to exalt him. In no very distant future his doctrines will be either forgotten or taken for granted, and in either case they will be incapable of keeping him alive in the theater or even in the library. But it looks more likely now than it did twenty years ago that his place in dramatic literature is, if not as secure as Shakespeare's, then at least as secure as that of Congreve or Sheridan.

It is obviously out of some such convictions as these that Mr. Evans has staged the play. He has costumed it as a period piece, but in such a way that though there are occasional moments when the result is to make it seem merely quaint, the effect on the whole is less to set the play in a particular time than to take it out of time and to put it in the eternity where comedy belongs. There must have been a temptation to play Tanner either as a tweedy and red-bearded young Shaw or even as a parlor pink of the thirties, but Mr. Evans has chosen instead to play him as a young man who is grotesque in nothing except his ideas, and that I think is right, though I am less sure of the rightness of Frances Rowe's Ann, who is stylized almost as much as the Gwendolin of Mr. Gielgud's "The Importance of Being Earnest." As an isolated figure she is striking and amusing. Her interpretation makes, of course, the point of the contrast between essential woman and the disguise which the sentimentality of the Roebuck Ramsens and the Ricky-Ticky-Tavies make her put on. But that is not the way I have always seen her in my mind's eye, and I should very much like to see an opposite manner tried. In the play Ann is the only person except Tanner who is a

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realist. Indeed, there is less self-deceit in her than there is in him. Her concessions to respectability and decorum have always seemed to me to be, not attempts to deceive, but overtly mocking, and I should like to see her played, not as even externally a Victorian doll, but as a woman whose feminine vitality is almost embarrassingly obvious.

If you leave out of account the pseudo-Ibsenite dramas of his nonage, then "Man and Superman" is, of course, the first of Shaw's plays in which he dared to profess preaching as his primary aim. Yet it is also, of all his plays, the one in which he makes most open fun of himself, the one in which the Shavian hero is most decisively put in his place; and Mr. Evans gets the full effect of the final scene in which Ann's "Go right on talking" brings the curtain down upon one of the funniest conclusions in modern comedy. Indeed, when the whole thing is played as he plays it, all the implications of the title except one pretty well fade away. The only real superman is and will remain merely Woman. Perhaps it is worth noting that the line which got the heartiest laugh was Tanner's definition of virtue—in the limited Victorian sense of the word—as merely "the trade unionism of the married."

Records

B. H. HAGGIN

COLUMBIA has issued a new recording of Beethoven's Violin Concerto made by Szigeti with Bruno Walter and the New York Philharmonic (Set 697; $7.10). I am unable to compare it with the old Columbia recording that Szigeti and Walter made in Europe; but even if my recollection of more excitingly dynamic phrasing by Szigeti in the old performance is correct, his playing in the new one is superb, and Walter again provides it with an excellent orchestral framework. Unfortunately, however, the recorded sound of the new performance is bad—worse even than that of the Brahms Concerto performance for which Columbia last year was given its prize for excellence by a jury of prominent record critics acting on behalf of some record magazine. On a wide-range machine the orchestra is harsh, the violins knife-edged and acidulous, the solo violin wiry and shrill. And I have no doubt whatsoever of my recollection of the beautiful recorded sound of the old performance.

Victor has issued a recording of Bach's Concerto in D minor for two violins made by Heifetz—who plays both solo parts—with a chamber orchestra under Franz Waxman (Set 1136; $3). Heifetz's playing in the first movement is uncharacteristically straightforward in style, but the joint performance of the movement by soloist and orchestra comes out constrained and jerky. In the slow movement we get the constant swelling and wailing that are characteristic of Heifetz's phrasing, and that carry over into the finale. The recorded sound of the performance lacks some of the spaciousness and richness one expects, but is otherwise good.

Other Columbia recordings include one of Dvorak's Symphony No. 1 played by the Cleveland Orchestra under Leinsdorf (Set 687; $7.10). The work is engagingly melodious, with a particularly fine opening movement; it is well performed; the recorded sound of the orchestra is clear and bright, though without all the warmth and luster it might have; and some of the surfaces of my copy are poor.

Also Strauss's music for "Le Bourgeois gentilhomme" played by the Pittsburgh Symphony under Reiner (Set 693; $7.10). The music is luxuriant and sugary, with some pretty tunes and humorous touches; the performance is good and is well reproduced except for the shrill and nasal sound of the solo violin.

And also an effective performance of Dukas's "L'Apprenti sorcier" by the Philadelphia Orchestra under Ormandy that is the best-reproduced of the group (12584-D; $1.25).

On a Victor single disc (10-1323; $.75) are excerpts from Verdi's "Un Ballo in Maschera" and Giordano's "Andrea Chenier" beautifully sung—a number of years ago, I would guess—by Bjoerling. On another (10-1325; $.75) is a piano piece by Schumann that I find uninteresting, his Arabeske Opus 18, which Iturbi plays in his excessively mannered and affected style. The piano is excellently reproduced; but the surfaces of my copy are noisy. And on still another (10-1326; $.75) are Rubinstein's performances of the Dance of Terror and Ritual Fire Dance from Falla's "El Amor Brujo"—the recorded sound of the piano too hard and bright in the first, dull and strange in the second, and the surfaces of my copy noisy.

From English Decca comes a set (ED28; $5) of Rimsky-Korsakov's "Russian Easter" Overture played by the National Symphony under Jorda. The work is one of Rimsky's best; ears accustomed to the sensationalized Stokowski performance may find Jorda's too unexciting, but it seems right, and the orchestral playing is very fine; and it is reproduced with marvelous fidelity to timbre, clarity of texture, spaciousness, and brilliance.

Also superbly reproduced is the excellent performance by the London Philharmonic under Sargent of the ballet music from Holst's "The Perfect Fool," which may have been effective with the stage action but is agreeably inconsequential by itself (Set ED31; $5).

And on a single disc (K1164; $2) are Handel's *Care Selve* from "Atalanta" and *Oh, Sleep! Why Dost Thou Leave Me?* from "Semele," sung with lovely vocal tone (except for the insecure opening phrase of the second piece) by Ada Alsop, soprano, with the Boyd Neel String Orchestra.

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Letters to the Editors

Upon What Meat Doth Our Caesar Feed?

Dear Sirs: Recently in your columns two able writers discussed the relative food value of the salmon and the tuna. But surely both of these excellent varieties are surpassed in importance by a much smaller fish. I refer, of course, to the humble red herring.

Consider how nourishing the red herring is, at least to that relatively small proportion of our population which constitutes our present ruling group, namely, the leaders of the Republican Party and the N. A. M. With its highly diverting odor, the red herring exerts an influence all out of proportion to its size. We all know what it accomplished at the last election.

Upon what meat doth this *our* Caesar feed that he has grown so great? Upon the little red herring, of course.

HUGH STRONG

San Diego, October 11

The A. D. A. and the Marshall Plan

Dear Sirs: In his article Marshall Plan vs. Socialism, in your issue of October 4, J. Alvarez del Vayo stated that "the recent statement of the Americans for Democratic Action unfortunately ignored the inescapable fact [that] if American liberals in their all-out support of the Marshall plan help to defeat socialism in Europe, their own natural allies will be wiped out in the inevitable clash between the extreme right and the Communists."

Mr. del Vayo's statement completely misrepresents the position of Americans for Democratic Action. Every A. D. A. statement on the Marshall plan has emphasized the very point which Mr. del Vayo claims we have ignored. We agree with him that this phase of the plan is crucial and feel that it justifies making A. D. A.'s record perfectly clear to readers of *The Nation*.

On July 22 the Executive Committee of A. D. A., together with several of its members, including Mrs. Roosevelt, Barry Bingham, Emil Rieve, and Herbert Lehman, proposed an immediate six-point program to give substance and reality to the "high hope" latent in the Marshall plan.

That program covered the "inescapable fact" which Mr. del Vayo claims was ignored. It read as follows:

> We urge that the Administration make clear—beyond any possibility of honest doubt or of purposeful distortion—that the United States does not intend to use its aid as a means of forcing upon European countries an economic system contrary to their freely expressed desires. We must repudiate those confused voices who would withold American aid from nations engaged in expanding the areas of public ownership or public control; we must make it abundantly clear that we regard the free governments of Europe, with their varying degrees of state control, as among the most honored champions of democracy.

Again on September 20 the National Executive Board of A. D. A., meeting in Chicago, issued a statement calling for a special session of Congress to meet the indivisible foreign and domestic crisis. That statement said that "we reject the proposals to deny aid to the Socialist governments of Europe. If we should use our aid as a means of vetoing internal change based on the free choice of the peoples concerned, we would sacrifice our best allies in the struggle against totalitarianism."

Elaborating that point, the lead editorial in the current edition of the *A. D. A. World*, official organ of Americans for Democratic Action, devotes itself to attacking those "confusionists" (Senator Ball, Harold Stassen, McGraw-Hill, and the N. A. M.) who advance the contention that Western Europe is finished unless it turns its back on all forms of socialism. . . .

Mr. del Vayo assumes that the entire Administration is committed to using the Marshall plan to help defeat socialism in Europe. He quotes Arthur Krock and Secretary Snyder, but ignores an authoritative report that such suggestions have been steadfastly rejected by Secretary Marshall, George Kennan, and the Harriman committee. In fact, the whole implication of Mr. del Vayo's article seems to be that liberals should not support the Marshall plan.

It seems very clear to us that it is the responsibility of American progressives to see that the Marshall plan is made a reality, free from the political restrictions proposed by the "confusionists."

Without the Marshall plan Europ faces another winter of hunger, want and chaos under which the remainin hope for democratic planning may col lapse. That, too, is a rather inescapabl fact which Mr. del Vayo apparently ig nores. If all liberals do the same, the all hope for social democracy in Europ is truly lost.

JAMES LOEB, JR.
National Executive Secretary, A. D. A
Washington, October 13

Wanted: an Integrated Science Foundation

Dear Sirs: In a recent article, Atom Bombs or Atomic Plenty, in *The N tion* of September 20, Leonard Eng condemned President Truman's veto the bill to establish a National Scien Foundation and emphasized the gre danger of continued military contr over scientific research. We agree wit Mr. Engel on the importance of th proposed foundation and on the dange of military control, but we would lik to point out certain facts that he appa ently overlooked.

First, as pointed out by the Ne York *Times* on August 8: "No gre harm has been done by this reluctai veto. No funds were specifically a propriated for research to be conducte under direction of a National Scien Foundation. . . . Hence it would ha been impossible to have set a [found tion] in motion"—this year, at least.

Second, it does not seem to us profi able to spend further time attacking justifying the Presidential veto. Even have shown that the critical issue no is not so much whether we are to ha a National Science Foundation—all pa ties seem to concur in this—but rath what *kind* of foundation it is to l The sponsors of the vetoed bill want a foundation publicly supported by g ernment funds but administered "dollar-a-year" men. Only by happy incidence is such an organization adm istered primarily in the public intere The alternative is a foundation b publicly supported and publicly c trolled, with direct responsibility to elected officials.

Third, it should be noted in conn

HUNGER

Able writer, top newspaper, publicity background—29 years old, who likes to eat regularly, seeks position.

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tion with Mr. Engel's apprehension over the military's dominance of science that the type of foundation proposed in the vetoed Smith bill was advanced and strongly supported by Dr. Vannevar Bush, chairman of the Research and Development Board of our National Military Establishment. This fact, taken in conjunction with the provisions of the bill regarding liaison with the army and navy, suggests the possibility that the proposed foundation would not have represented a clean break from military control.

In condemning control of basic research Mr. Engel very effectively pointed out that in spite of the excellent qualities of individual officers, military control would lead in the long run to emphasis on weapons for war rather than on peace-time applications, because *"the system is stronger than any number of excellent individual officers."* We would like to point out that the same principle applies to the proposed foundation. If the *wrong* sort of foundation is established, its stultifying effects may well prove stronger than the efforts of any number of well-meaning individuals working within it.

The task for progressives is not simply to urge a science foundation but to insist on a type of foundation that will be fully integrated into our national life. Such a foundation should be *democratically* administered to promote the general welfare through the encouragement and support of basic research in all sciences, including the social sciences.

IRVING FEISTER
For the Science Legislation Study Group, Washington Association of Scientists

Washington, October 8

Arbitration and Sovereignty Not Incompatible

Dear Sirs: Your editorial Vetoes and Other Tools, in *The Nation* of August 30, says that the Netherlands ambassador to the United States, Mr. Van Kleffens, rejected United Nations arbitration of the Indonesian dispute because such action would infringe Dutch sovereignty. Then follows this statement, "He did not bother to explain why the Security Council's cease-fire order had not infringed Dutch sovereignty or why American mediation would not do so."

The fact of the matter is that on August 15 Mr. Van Kleffens told the Council, "The United Nations scored a success with the cease-fire invitation.

Crossword Puzzle No. 234

By FRANK W. LEWIS



ACROSS

1 In a way it's late around here for Romans. (7)
5 T. N. T. does, ditto a storm, a photographer or sometimes a pitcher. (5, 2)
9 This sometimes comes back to Wintergreen. (5)
10 Latin cone which took eight years to construct. (9)
11 and 12. Equipment of holding companies? (6, 3, 5)
13 Those who did sometimes paid for their tickets later. (7)
15 I bled as a result of getting hurt. (7)
17 Blood vessel? (7)
19 Indeed, sir! (7)
21 What to do with your bright light on the road coming back? (5)
23 Magnificent but novel. (9)
25 These shouldn't be used on rainy days. (9)
26 Marries around fifty, but forms a perfect union! (5)
27 Put R. C. in 13, if it doesn't go to extremes. (7)
28 The fiddle should be tough, because it is. (7)

DOWN

1 Sheds. (7)
2 A lone whale finds time for bobbing. (9)
3 No danger of ticks, if you stop it. (5)
4 Paroled, but often behind bars. (7)
5 Happened to be debited, in old accounts. (7)
6 Might be read on them? (9)
7 Sort of coins for graft. (5)
8 Sleep is disturbed for the worn. (7)
14 Add the rye without the water. (9)
16 Parisian Hawkshaw. (9)
17 How to get abreast of a hot dog? (7)
18 Sort of rope with get-up in it. (7)
19 Sort of side streets. (7)
20 People who belong to this usually have quite a line. (7)
22 Perhaps you'll see me around a broken window. (5)
24 Both he and it have seen the seamy side of life in Paris. (5)

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE No. 233

ACROSS:—1 ANAGRAM; 5 DANGERS; 9 PRESSED; 10 ABANDON; 11 EBB; 13 REGAIN; 15 ACCRUE; 16 COURAGE; 17 SODA; 19 SEAM; 20 CHAFFINCH; 21 APSE; 23 YORE; 26 FLICKED; 29 SOBBED; 30 ADD; 32 CALLING; 33 RISOTTO; 34 ENRAGED; 35 YULE LOG.

DOWN:—1 AMPERES; 2 AVENGED; 3 RUSTIC; 4 MADE; 5 DRAB; 6 NUANCE; 7 ENDORSE; 8 SUNBEAM; 12 BAREFACED; 14 NOTABLE; 15 AGONIES; 18 ACE; 19 SHY; 21 ARTICLE; 22 SECULAR; 24 ORBITAL; 25 ENDLONG; 26 and 28 across FLYING TACKLE; 27 DORSAL; 30 AGED; 31 DRAY.

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You know that we accepted that on humanitarian grounds, not because we recognize the jurisdiction or the Council."

In all likelihood Mr. Van Kleffens never bothered to explain why United States mediation of the Indonesian dispute wouldn't have infringed Dutch sovereignty because it never occurred to him to do so. After all, if the Netherlands government voluntarily accepts third-party mediation, the question of sovereignty doesn't arise.

With a few notable exceptions American liberals have not looked kindly on the Netherlands police action in Indonesia. In Holland, however, the Socialist Party of Labor, which together with the Catholic Peoples Party forms the coalition government, has supported this action. Furthermore, these Dutch "liberals" took this stand even though their party is strongly committed to a policy of cooperation with the Republic.

It is well known that on March 25, 1947, Dutch and Indonesian representatives signed the Linggadjati agreement for the settlement of their peoples' future relationship. The Socialist Soetan Sjahrir signed for the Republic and the Socialist Willem Schermerhorn signed for the Netherlands. This agreement was widely praised as setting the pattern for a new and equitable relation between the peoples of East and West. To say the least, however, the agreement hasn't lived up to its promise—or rather, the Republicans haven't lived up to the agreement.

Remember that the Indoesians are not fighting for their freedom: that has already been promised to them as of 1949, and their interim de facto authority has already been recognized. The Netherlands government still stands on its offer to deal with the Republic on the basis of the Linggadjati agreement.

H. J. FRIEDERICY
Chief of Political Affairs, Netherlands Department of Overseas Territories

New York, October 7

Cheers for Neuberger's Alaska Articles

Dear Sirs: This is fan mail! I hope very much that you have had a bale of letters commending you for Richard L. Neuberger's articles on Alaska. For someone as well known as he to write so fearlessly and honestly, and with no ax to grind, does my heart good.

I stayed up there for some months, and it is just about God's most beautiful country, and the people are for the most part, friendly, frank, and intelligent. Yet, as he says, the Territory is tied—head, neck, and heels—and the situation for enterprising young people up there makes me sick! I am glad Mr. Neuberger is talking about it to a new group of readers.

LOUISE POTTER

Poughkeepsie, N. Y., October 10

A Social Affair in Johannesburg

Dear Sirs: At the present session of the United Nations the treatment of the colored peoples in South Africa is once again the subject of discussion, and it is the fervent hope of liberal-minded citizens of that country that the introduction of a more progressive policy may result.

The conception that the white race are superior to others creates the belief that the white man may treat his colored neighbor as he pleases. A recent incident will illustrate this: Only a few weeks ago a native employed as a chef at a home in a fashionable suburb of Johannesburg was beaten to death by Europeans while waiting to board a tram car. Investigation revealed that the assault was provoked by the fact that the native was well dressed and was wearing gloves; the Europeans apparently found this incompatible with "keeping the Kaffir in his place."

The evil of this attitude, however, lies not so much in the injustice to individuals as in the fact that the systematic suppression of the colored people effectively prevents their playing a part in the development of the country and creates bitterness which can only become more dangerous with the passage of the years.

F. LANDAU

Johannesburg, October 11

An Important Difference

Dear Sirs: In my article in *The Nation* of September 13, Chicago Has One More Chance, there is a statement that the coming Chicago referendum for a bond issue for public housing "will most certainly be voted down now as a result of the Fernwood violence." This is a garbled version of my original text. The bond issue might be defeated. The difference between *might* and *most certainly* is important to advocates of public housing in Chicago who are working to turn *might* into *will not.*

HOMER A. JACK

Chicago, October 7

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